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What is striking . . . is the shift in attention from 
machinery to resources, from man’s mastery of  nature to 
his dependence on its bounty, from Harrod-Domar-Solow 
growth economics to Malthusian-Ricardian scarcity 
economics.  And the principle of diminishing returns, 
rather than increasing yields to scale, becomes the 
analytical motif.2 
 
 
  “The coal industry is caught up in powerful undercurrents of 
change that are profoundly affecting its course.”3  While such sentiments 
 
 1.  Associate Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law.  The 
author appreciates the Public Lands and Resources Law Review for convening this 
symposium, inviting me to participate, and assisting in preparing this paper for 
publication.  The author also thanks Robert R. Nordhaus, Kyle W. Danish, and Mark 
Squillace, for their comments, although the contents of the article remain my sole 
responsibility. 
 2.  Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society 463 (1973). 
 3.  Reed Moyer, The Role of Coal: Problems and Policies, 18 Nat. 
Resources J. 761 (1978). 
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are now being echoed in 2013, this statement is well over 30 years old.  
And it was roughly thirty-six years ago that Amory B. Lovins warned, 
“[t]he commitment to a long-term coal economy many times the scale of 
today’s makes the doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration 
early in the next century virtually unavoidable.”4  Lovins has continued his 
quest since then, most recently suggesting that fossil fuels could be phased 
out by 2050.5   
Yet, the United States energy landscape has changed significantly 
in these intervening 36 years.  The United States has more natural gas and 
oil than previously projected.  Renewable energy resources were an 
unsung promise in the 1970s, while today they are here and growing.  And 
coal remains abundant. 
In response to these shifts, and with climate change the defining 
challenge for our generation, reducing coal’s contribution toward 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has become a principal target.6  Coal, 
after all, accounts for roughly one third of all U.S. GHG emissions.7  And 
it is neither surprising nor unexpected that additional regulatory programs 
are being imposed to address GHG emissions, as well as other emissions 
from coal-fired power plants, such as air toxics, particulate matter, sulfur 
dioxides, and nitrogen dioxides.8  Public concern about the externalities of 
coal, including its social and health effects, is increasingly becoming 
 
 4.  Amory B. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken? 55 For. 
Affairs 65, 67 (1976-1977). 
 5.  Amory B. Lovins, A Farewell to Fossil Fuels, 91 For. Affairs 134 
(2012); see also Amory B. Lovins, Reinventing Fire: Bold Business Solutions for the 
New Energy Era 232 (2011) (phasing out coal by 2050). 
 6.  See generally Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and 
the End of Coal as a Source of “Cheap” Electricity, 12 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 407 (2010). 
 7.  See EPA: Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (July 13, 2013) (coal 
accounts from roughly 80% of all CO2 emissions from utility sector, and utility sector 
accounts for roughly one third of all U.S. GHG emissions).  See also Robert L. 
Glicksman, Coal-Fired Power Plants, Greenhouse Gases, and State Statutory 
Substantial Endangerment Provisions: Climate Change Comes to Kansas, 56 U. Kan. 
L. Rev. 517, 527-28 (2008).  Some reports suggest that coal accounts for roughly 20% 
of all global GHG emissions.  See Ctr. for Climate and Energy Solutions, Coal and 
Climate Change Facts, www.c2es.org/science-impacts/basics/fact-sheets/coal-facts 
(July 13, 2013). 
 8.  See infra nn. 68–73 and accompanying text. 
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pronounced.9  Nor is it remarkable that the Sierra Club has an aggressive 
“beyond coal” campaign.10  
The tension surrounding coal’s future is striking.  Today, some in 
the coal industry talk about the Obama administration’s purported “war on 
coal.”11 In a historic speech on the floor of the Senate, retiring Senator Jay 
Rockefeller (D-W.V.) warned that the coal industry must “face reality” 
and that, unfortunately, the “dialogue on coal” has reached a “stunningly 
fevered pitch.”12  New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg recently 
tagged coal as “a dead man walking.”13  The industry, once committed to 
expanding U.S. markets through commercialization of clean coal 
technologies, has now focused on exporting coal to expanding overseas 
markets.   
What, then, should we make of coal’s future prospect, particularly 
coal from the nation’s western public lands?  The Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) projects that coal will remain the nation’s largest 
energy source for, at least, several decades, although the electric utility 
industry is likely to retire roughly 49 gigawatts of coal-fired electric 
generation by 2022.14  Between 2011 and 2012, however, coal 
 
 9.  Alan H. Lockwood et al., Coal’s Assault on Human Health, 
http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/psr-coal-fullreport.pdf (2009). Some of the nation’s 
most prominent natural resource economists suggest that coal-fired generation is the 
largest industrial contributor to gross external damages for pollution.  Nicholas Z. 
Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the United States Economy, 
101 Am. Econ. Rev. 1649 (2011).  In Europe, the Health and Environment Alliance 
reports that costs associated with burning coal accounts for approximately €43 billion 
annually. Health and Environment Alliance, Coal’s Health Bill Reaches €43 Billion a 
Year, http://www.env-health.org/resources/press-releases/article/coal-s-health-bill-
reaches-eur43 (March 7, 2013). 
 10.  See Sierra Club, Beyond Coal, http://content.sierraclub.org/coal/ (July 
13, 2013). 
 11.  Manuel Quinones, Industry Boosters Conflicted About “War” Whoops, 
E&E News (Jan. 16, 2013); see also Manuel Quinones, Industry Divided on Obama 
Climate Plans, But ‘War’ Remains Battle Cry, E&E News (July 3, 2013). 
 12.  158 Cong. Rec. S4316 (daily ed. June 20, 2012). 
 13.  Manuel Quinones, “Coal Is A Dead Man Walking” – Bloomberg, E&E 
News (Feb. 27, 2013). 
 14.  United States Energy Info. Administration, AEO2013 Early Release 
Overview 8, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er%282013%29.pdf  (July 
13, 2013). The Government Accountability Office predicts that the United States will 
retire between 15 and 18 percent of its coal-fired generation by 2020.  Government 
Accountability Off., Significant Changes Are Expected in Coal-Fueled Generation, 
But Coal is Likely to Remain a Key Fuel Source, GAO-13-72 (Oct. 29, 2012).  Cf. 
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consumption in the power sector declined by 12.5 percent and coal-fired 
generation decreased from 1.73 billion megawatt hours to 1.52 megawatt 
hours; meanwhile, gas-fired generation rose during this period by 21.4 
percent.15  And once again coal exports are breaking records, with 
numbers likely exceeding the 1981 record of 112.5 million tons, and most 
of the coal demand is from Europe not Asia.16  But what is coal’s mid and 
long-term prospect—where is coal’s future market?  Unless new growth 
markets emerge here in the U.S. or elsewhere in the world, capital 
investment in new coal mines or expansions of existing mines could 
become risky.  This is acutely important for the west in areas like the 
Powder River Basin (PRB), where coal is a critical component of the 
economy.17  
This essay, therefore, reviews how coal has arrived at this critical 
juncture and suggests that the time is ripe for rationally assessing coal’s 
place in the U.S.’s energy horizon.  Part I summarizes the growth of coal 
in the U.S., recounting how coal effectively gained prominence for 
supplying energy in the 1970s.  Part II then reviews how electric utilities 
have responded to changing market dynamics, and how those dynamics 
have become intensified by the suite of factors indirectly affecting coal’s 
utilization.   The coal industry in the west has responded to these factors 
by focusing on expanding our nation’s northwest port capacity for oversee 
coal markets.  Part III, therefore, recounts these efforts.  It also examines 
the dialogue surrounding the cumulative environmental effects that might 
flow from greatly expanding port capacity and increasing the amount of 
coal shipped to overseas markets.  While the essay suggests that existing 
law may not require a broad programmatic approach for exploring the 
array of effects, it counters that such an approach appears sensible.  
 
Daniel Cusick, Coal May Not Regain its Dominance in the Electric Sector—Study, 
E&E News (June 7, 2013) (coal has rebounded from 2012 historic low, but may not 
recapture dominance as fuel source). 
 15.  Daniel Cusick, Power Producers Accelerate Switch from Coal to Gas, 
E&E News (Feb. 27, 2013) (describing EIA report). 
 16.  Chris Preston, U.S. Coal Exports on Track for Record Year, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/u-coal-exports-track-record-201146458.html (Oct. 3, 
2012); see also Collin Sullivan, U.S. Set Record for Coal Exports in March—EIA, 
E&E News (June, 2013). 
 17.  In Wyoming, for instance, coal is a vibrant part of the state’s economy.  
See Benjamin Storrow, New Obama Carbon Limits Could Hit Wyoming, 
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/new-obama-carbon-limits-could-hit-wyoming-
coal/article_a3a652f7-c98b-5a15-a8d9-dc43f06ad761.html (June 26, 2013). 
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Consequently, Parts IV and V conclude that a new paradigm seems 
plausible, employing, for instance, a duly entrusted Department of Energy 
capable of exploring the range of issues affecting and affected by coal 
utilization and proffering sound choices for coal’s future role in a 
coordinated and coherent national energy policy. 
 
I. COAL’S MYSTIQUE 
 
For most of our history, coal has served a secondary role in 
supplying electric generation.18 Prior to the 1880s, first water and then 
wood fed the nation’s growing economy.19  Coal only became the nation’s 
favored fuel by 1886, and its prominence lasted until shortly after World 
War II.20 During the early years of coal’s rise, the railroads and the 
industrial sector used most of the coal.21  And while coal’s use for electric 
 
 18.  The picture worldwide is quite different, with coal serving as the “pre-
eminent fuel until the mid-twentieth century.”  John G. Clark, The Political Economy 
of World Energy 15 (1990). 
 19.  Sam H. Schurr & Bruce C. Netschert, Energy in the American 
Economy, 1850-1975: An Economic Study of its History and Prospects 61–62 (1960). 
 20. John G. Clark, Energy and the Federal Government: Fossil Fuel 
Policies, 1900-1946 xxi (1987).  Coal during this period provided half the nation’s 
energy requirements.  Id.  “Coal’s input to energy consumption peaked in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century when it provided over 70 percent of energy needs.”  
Id.  Coal production quadrupled between 1880 and 1900, and doubled between 1900 
and 1920, reaching 678 million tons by 1918.  Id.  This was roughly a 411 percent 
increase in production.  Clark, supra n. 18, at 15.  World War I then spurred increased 
coal production.  Clark, supra n. 20, at 4.  A trade advisor wrote for Foreign Affairs in 
1920s that coal’s dominance “seems sure to prevail indefinitely.”  Walter S. Tower, 
The Coal Question, 2 For. Affairs 100, 101 (1923-1924). 
 21.  Clark, supra n. 18, at 21–22, 27.  This coal generally was eastern 
bituminous (largely for industrial uses) and anthracite (for heating and steam 
purposes) coal.  Clark, supra n. 20, at 3–4, 8.  And the railroads and industrial sector 
controlled much of this coal.  Id. at 7.  This explains why, for western coal, railroad 
land grants often excluded conveying minerals but included the disposition of coal and 
iron for use by the railroads.  See 12 Stat. 489 (1870); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903).  By the 1950’s, the United States consumed roughly 
one-third of the then world’s energy supply (9 tons of coal equivalent per person), 
with about only 25% from coal. Schurr, supra n. 19, at 1.  This reflected a dramatic 
change from prior decades, when coal provided a much larger share.  “The 
transformation of the American economy from its earlier coal basis has involved the 
consumption in recent years of enormous amounts of oil and gas.” Id. at 2. 
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energy rose during this period, it was being out-competed by the 
emergence of the oil and gas industry.22   
The 1970s energy crisis effectively elevated coal to its status as a 
dominant source for producing electricity.23  After all, the United States’ 
energy sources had become increasingly reliant on oil and natural gas, 
even though the country had yet to develop and adopt much of the 
modern-day legislation aimed at increasing domestic oil and gas 
production.24  Going into the decade, therefore, federal coal, not 
surprisingly, accounted for only a small percent of the national 
production.25   
This all changed once Congress and the administration responded 
to the 1970s energy crisis.  The summer and early fall of 1974 marked the 
emergence of President Nixon’s Project Independence.26  A few years 
 
 22.  See Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy 
Policy, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 355, 358, 362, 365 (1990). 
 23.  Dan Tarlock aptly observes that, at the time, “the successful 
achievement of domestic energy supply independence is widely thought to require a 
return to coal.”  Dan Tarlock, Western Coal in Context, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 315, 317 
(1981). 
 24.  Offshore oil and gas development, for instance, only became prominent 
after Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) in 1953, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2012), but little development occurred until after the 1970s and 
the passage of the 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA.  See generally Sam Kalen, 
Cruise Control and Speed Bumps: Energy Policy and Limits for Outer Continental 
Shelf Leasing, 7 Envt’l & Energy Law & Pol’y J. 155 (2012). 
 25.  Marion Clawson, The Federal Lands Revisited 93 (1983); Tarlock, 
supra n. 23, at 326, 333–335. 
 26.  President Nixon delivered his first energy message to Congress in June 
1971.  See Neil De Marchi, Energy Policy Under Nixon: Mainly Putting Out Fires, in 
Energy Policy in Perspective: Today’s Problems, Yesterday’s Solutions 395, 409 
(Craufurd D. Goodwin, William J. Barber, James L. Chochrane, Neil D. Marchi, 
Joseph A. Yager eds., The Brookings Institution 1981). In 1973, he urged the 
relaxation of environmental standards and encouraged that plants not switch away 
from coal.  Id. at 447.  In a macroeconomic model for matching energy supply and 
demand, the first of its kind and the apparent predecessor to the Energy Information 
Administration’s Annual Energy Outlooks, the lengthy 1974 Project Independence 
Blueprint Report forecast that coal’s contribution toward U.S. energy supply would 
rise from 17 percent to 23.4 percent by 1985 (assuming an $11 ton cost for coal).  See 
Jerry A. Hausman, Project Independence Report: An Appraisal of U.S. Energy Needs 
Up to 1985, 6 Bell J. Econ. 517, 533 (1975); see also De Marchi, supra at 461–66 
(describing Project Independence Blueprint project). 
On August 12, 1974, President Ford highlighted Project Independence in his speech to 
the joint session of Congress, as well as during the Sept. 23, 1974 World Energy 
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later, when President Carter spoke to the Nation on April 18, 1977 and 
proclaimed that the energy crisis was the moral equivalent of war, he 
championed increased coal production.27  Increased use of coal became 
one of the five principal aspects of the array of programs that became the 
nation’s energy policy.28  The President’s National Energy Plan called for 
roughly doubling the 1975 coal production and consumption levels by 
1985.29  Even with a long coal strike in 1978, coal production had grown 
 
Conference in Detroit, Michigan.  In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Supply and 
Environmental Coordination Act (ESECA), Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974), 
which promoted the use of coal over other fossil fuels if a plant had the capability of 
burning coal. A year later, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(EPCA), Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (start of vehicle emission standards, 
creating strategic petroleum reserve and extending oil price controls). 
 27.  Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation, 1977 Pub. Papers 656, 656–663. 
“Coal,” under Carter’s plan, was the “key” to bridging the “gap between even the 
modestly rising energy requirements of sustained economic growth and the relatively 
stable U.S. production of oil and natural gas.”  James L. Cochrane, Carter Energy 
Policy and the Ninety-fifth Congress, in Energy Policy in Perspective: Today’s 
Problems, Yesterday’s Solutions 547, 573 (Craufurd D. Goodwin, William J. Barber, 
James L. Cochrane, Neil D. Marchi, Joseph A. Yager eds., The Brookings Institution 
1981).  See also Mel Horwitch, Coal: Constrained Abundance, in Energy Future: 
Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School 79 (Robert Stobaugh & 
Daniel Yergin eds., Random House 1979); President’s Comm’n on Coal, Acceptable 
Ways to Hasten the Substitution of Coal for Oil: An Interim Report (1979) (often 
dubbed the “Rockefeller Report”). In the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 
1978, Congress regulated existing power plants’ use of fuel, and it further 
prohibited—with exceptions and limitations—the use of gas or oil in new power 
plants, effectively supplanting the ESECA.  Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289.  For a 
symposium on the Fuel Use Act, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Introduction: Symposium 
on the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 29 Kan. L. Rev. 297 (1981).  
See also Edward L. Lublin, The Future of the Department of Energy’s Coal 
Conversion Program, 2 Energy L. J. 355 (1981); J. Richard Tiano, Michael K. 
Hammaker, Coal Conversion: Procedural Improprieties in Pursuit of a National 
Energy Policy, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 482 (1979).  A few years later, Congress removed 
the restriction against using natural gas.  Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 
97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). 
 28.  Henry M. Jackson, The Role for Greater Coal Utilization for United 
States’ National Energy Policy, 29 U. Kan. L. Rev. 303, 304 (1981).  See also Richard 
L. Gordon, The Worlds of Coal—The Perspective from the U.S.A., 10 Case W. Res. J. 
Intl. L. 659 (1987) (useful examination of the history of coal production and 
utilization from comparative perspective); Marvin O. Young, Conflicting Government 
Regulations and Policies Affecting Coal Development, 9 Nat. Res. Law. 503 (1976) 
(coal industry official noting importance of coal to nation’s energy policy). 
 29.  Cochrane, supra n. 27, at 561, 594; Reed Moyer, The Role of Coal: 
Problems and Polices, 18 Nat. Res. J. 761, 762, 767 (1978).  The Carter 
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dramatically since the early part of the decade, with the 1978 level of over 
60 million tons well above the 1973 level.30 At the end of the decade, the 
Executive Director for the International Energy Agency suggested that 
worldwide production of coal would need to triple by 2000 to satisfy 
growing energy demand.31 This emphasis on coal not surprisingly 
prompted the price of coal to increase over 15% during the 1970s.32 
Coal’s importance is possibly best illustrated by the Carter 
administration’s effort to convert coal into gas or liquids, and 
correspondingly reduce U.S. dependence on oil and natural gas.  The 
National Energy Plan contemplated the construction of several coal 
gasification plants by the 1990s.33  Germany had employed successfully 
coal liquefaction during World War II,34 and Sasol had developed a coal 
gasification facility in South Africa.35   The U.S. began exploring 
liquefaction before the energy crisis, with several pieces of legislation 
targeting research and development funding for coal conversion 
technologies.36  The U.S., moreover, dedicated considerable resources to 
promoting a federally sponsored synthetic fuels program.37  One example 
 
administration developed a centralized planning process, designed to calculate the 
amount of coal needed for leasing in one of twelve regions (6 of which predominately 
federal coal) throughout the country.  See Robert H. Nelson, Public Lands and Private 
Rights: The Failure of Scientific Management 290 (1995).  The DOE set production 
targets, but it soon became apparent that such planning was unworkable and the DOI 
moved more toward a predictable market planning process.  Id. at 291. 
 30.  Clawson, supra n. 25, at 290. 
 31.  Ulf Lantzke, Expanding World Use of Coal, 58 For. Affairs 351 (1979-
1980). 
 32.  Steven Ferrey, The New Rules: A Guide to Electric Market Regulation 
269 (2000) (referencing U.S. Energy Info. Administration, The Changing Structure of 
the Electric Power Industry: An Update (1997)). Since 1975, the industry generally 
has experienced declining coal prices. Joseph P. Tomain & Richard D. Cudahy, 
Energy Law in A Nutshell 322 (2d Ed. 2011). 
 33.  U.S. Dept. of Energy, Report on the Solvent Refined Coal 
Demonstration Plant Program (SRC-II), IG-0180 at 3 (March 3, 1982). 
 34.  See Ronald K. Olson, Coal Liquefaction: Issues Presented by a 
Developing Technology, 12 Tulsa L.J. 657, 659–60 (1977). 
 35.  Id. at 661. 
 36.  Id. at 660–64. 
 37.  United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
294, 94 Stat. 633.  See generally Findings and Recommendations of the Advisory 
Panel on Synthetic Fuels, To the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House 
of Representatives (1980) (on file with author); U.S. Energy Research & Dev. 
Administration, Proposed Synthetic Fuels Commercial Demonstration Program: Fact 
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is that, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, with DOE assistance, North 
Dakota became home to the Great Plains Coal Gasification Project, 
converting lignite coal into synthetic natural gas.38  
Federal public lands naturally became a prime source for feeding 
the nation’s appetite for more coal.39  At the time, the United States was 
believed to own 200 billion tons of coal.40  The 1970 Clean Air Act 
(CAA) indirectly advantaged western coal, by mandating reductions of 
sulfur emissions.41  When utilities switched to burning federal coal, such 
as in the Powder River Basin (PRB), Congress amended the CAA in 1977 
to remove the regional advantage gained by the west.42  Despite an 
intensive litigation campaign,43 federal coal production increased tenfold 
during the 1970s.44  
 
Book (1976) (on file with author); Ad Hoc Panel on Liquefaction of Coal of the 
Committee on Processing and Utilization of Fossil Fuels, Nat. Acad. of Sci., 
Technology for the Liquefaction of Coal: Summary (1977) (on file with author); 
Lawrence H. Goulder & Marc S. Robinson, Synfuels: Justification for and 
Consequences of Government Intervention (1982) (on file with author). 
 38.  See U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Synthetic Fuels: Status of the Great Plains 
Coal Gasification Project, RCED-88-53FS (Nov. 10, 1987).  Eventually President 
Reagan shuttered the synthetic fuels program. See Tomain, supra n. 22, at 372 (noting 
also that program was destined to fail at the time due to cost and market forces).  See 
also Barbara Rudolph, Time Magazine, Shattered Hopes for Synfuels, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1050485,00.html (Apr. 18, 2005). 
 39.  Tarlock, supra n. 23, at 318. 
 40.  Tom Arrandale, The Battle for Natural Resources 86 (1983). 
 41.  See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, William T. Hassler, Clean 
Coal/Dirty Air: Or How the Clean Air Act Became a MultiBillion-Dollar Bail-Out for 
High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should be Done About It, 15-16 (1981). 
 42.  Id. at 42–58.  The 1977 Amendments to the CAA reduced the 
competitiveness of western coal by requiring the use of scrubbers for all new power 
coal-fired power plants.  Congressional Quarterly, The Battle for Natural Resources 
85 (1983); Richard L. Gordon, The Worlds of Coal-The Perspective from the U.S.A., 
10 Case W. Res. J. Int’l. L. 659, 663-64 (1978). For a seminal study, see Bruce A. 
Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 
89 Yale L.J. 1484, 1466 (1980). 
 43.  Arrandale, supra n. 40, 87–99. 
 44.  Id. at 82–83, 87.  In fact, “Midwestern mines produced 138 million tons 
of coal” in 1970, while mines in “Montana and Wyoming [only] produced a mere 10 
million tons.  By 1980, midwestern production had increased about 22 percent to 173 
million tons; however, production in Montana and Wyoming had grown over one 
thousand percent to 124 million tons.”  R. McGreggor Cawley, Federal Land, Western 
Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion & Environmental Politics 78 (1993).  See also 
Clawson, supra n. 25, at 290 (table on coal leases and production from 1960 to 1980). 
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Yet, continual controversy best characterizes the modern federal 
coal program during its first decade.45  No structured federal coal-leasing 
program existed, and lessees were holding federal coal speculatively rather 
than mining it.  In 1974, therefore, federally leased coal only contributed 
4% to the nation’s coal production.46  Two years later, only 59 of the 533 
existing leases were producing coal.47  The coal-leasing program 
remained stagnant for most of the decade: no coherent approach toward 
planning existed, and the recently passed National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA)48 required that federal agencies assess the environmental 
impacts associated with coal leasing.  And, shortly before President Carter 
released the National Energy Plan, Congress finally passed the previously 
vetoed Federal Coal Leasing Act Amendments of 1975 (FCLAA).49  
FCCLA primarily sought to promote timely, efficient, and coordinated 
development of the nation’s coal resources.50  The idea that leases would 
be developed diligently, or somewhat quickly, became a principal aspect 
of the new leasing program.51  Of course, this idea pervades federal 
 
 45.  For a history of the prior regulation of federal coal, see generally 
Robert Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy (1983); Sam Kalen, Where Do We 
Go From Here?: The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act – Past, Present, and 
Future, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 1023 (1996); Leo M. Krulitz, Management of Federal Coal 
Resources, 24 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 139 (1978); Jerome H. Simonds, History of 
Federal Coal Leasing—A Lawyer’s Viewpoint, 13 Tulsa L. J. 671 (1978); Guy R. 
Martin, A New Program for the Management of Federal Coal Reserves, 82 W. Va. L. 
Rev. 1019 (1980); Tarlock, supra n. 23; Gary J. Wicks, Coal Leasing Program: 
Department of the Interior, 13 Tulsa L.J. 664 (1978).  The first principal laws 
affecting the disposition of coal occurred during the post-Civil War period, with too 
much coal being lost and precipitating the need for an executive withdrawal and 
ultimately the need for the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act.  See Shannon L. Bybee, Jr., 
Richard H. Stahle, Robert L. Schmid & Jeffery L. Haggard, Legal Study of Coal 
Resources on Public Lands: Prepared for the Public Land Law Review Commission 2 
(1968) (on file with author). 
 46.  De Marchi, supra n. 26, at 477. 
 47.  U.S. Government Accountability Off., Mineral Resources: Federal 
Coal-Leasing Program Needs Strengthening, GAO/RCED-94-10 at 15 (Sept. 16, 
1994). 
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 4321–4335.  See infra nn. 118–120 and accompanying text. 
 49.  Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976).  See generally Kalen, supra 
n. 45; James M. Voytko, Western Coal Development Policy: The Federal Coal 
Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, 1 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 289 (1976). 
 50.  Kalen, supra n. 45. 
 51.  Id. at 1034–1042.  Pre-FCLAA leases could have included the 
equivalent of diligent development requirements (and in pre-FCLAA 1976 regulations 
 COAL’S PLATEAU AND ENERGY HORIZON? 155 
resource programs, whether correctly or not.52  Going into the Regan 
administration, federally produced coal grew, but only to approximately 
10% of total coal production.53 Yet, between 1967 and 1993, federal coal 
production went from 1% of total U.S. production to 30% of total U.S. 
production.54 
The irony perhaps of coal’s growth is that it paralleled the rise of 
environmental regulation and federal land use planning.   Dan Tarlock 
aptly explains that “[f]ederal coal policy since 1973 can be seen as an 
exercise in futility because incentives for coal use were quickly cancelled 
by disincentives adopted in the name of regional political equity.”55 After 
all, “[m]any utilities in the 1960s switched from coal to oil to avoid the 
environmental problem involved in burning coal.”56 And the reliance on 
federal coal also occurred during the same decade that Congress passed 
the Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, the National Forest 
Management Act of 1976, and the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976.57  Although vetoed twice by President Ford,58 the Surface 
 
this requirement became expressed, 41 Fed. Reg. 21779 (May 28, 1976)), but 
disorganized planning characterized the program.  See Off. of Tech. Assessment, 
Management of Fuel and Nonfuel Minerals in Federal Land: Current Status and 
Issues (1979). 
 52.  Soon after the coal leasing program became operational, the General 
Accounting Office suggested that the program “lack[s] the flexibility needed to take 
into account all the factors affecting timely development of [the federal coal leases], 
and could result in either forcing development of certain leases before market demand 
materializes or forcing their cancellation just about the time demand materializes.”  
U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Simplifying The Federal Coal Management Program, EMD-
81-109 at 2 (Aug. 20, 1981).  For modern concerns about diligent development of 
federal resources, see U.S. Int. Dept., Oil and Gas Lease Utilization, Onshore and 
Offshore: Updated Report to the President, 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/Final-Report.pdf (May 2012). 
 53.  Tarlock, supra n. 23, at 319. 
 54.  Robert H. Nelson, Public Lands and Private Rights: The Failure of 
Scientific Management 287 (1995).  Overall U.S. production between 1970 and 2001 
increased from 520 million tons to over a billion tons.  See Tomain & Cudahy, supra 
n. 32, at 324. 
 55.  Tarlock, supra n. 23, at 319. 
 56.  Leonard S. Hyman & Robert C. Hyman, America’s Electric Utilities: 
Past, Present & Future 39 (8th Ed. 2005). See also Donald P. Irwin & K. Dennis Sisk, 
The Fuel Use Act and DOE’s Regulations: A Utility Industry Perspective, 29 U. Kan. 
L. Rev. 319, 320 (1981). 
 57.  Guy Martin explained how this mélange of laws passed by Congress 
merged with policy choices and judicial decisions to “profoundly influenced the 
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Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 became law upon President 
Carter’s August 3, 1977 signature.59  This law “revolutionized coal 
mining in the United States,” by enacting a series of programs designed to 
address the adverse effects of surface coal mining.60 
II. THE FLUID ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR 
Amidst this dynamic suite of new programs and ever-changing 
market forces, electric utilities began to develop coal-fired power plants 
more rapidly than in the past.  These newly developed plants were larger 
than their predecessors, and eventually between 1970 and the mid-1980s 
the majority of the nation’s current coal generating capacity became 
operational.61  
The development of these coal plants occurred, moreover, while 
the electric utility sector began its period of rapid transition.  Prior to the 
1980s, the electric utility industry seemed somewhat stable, operating 
under an arguably simple vertically integrated market dynamic.62  Starting 
 
manner in which the [Department] manage[d] coal resources.”  Martin, supra n. 45, at 
1021. 
 58.  M. McElfish, Jr. & Ann E. Beier, Environmental Regulation of Coal 
Mining: SMCRA’s Second Decade 5 (1990). 
 59.  Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447 (Aug. 3, 1977).  For surface mining 
prior to the Act’s passage, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Old King Coal and the Merry 
Rapists of Appalachia, 22 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 650 (1971). 
 60.  James M. McElfish, supra n. 58, at xv.  See Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining and Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
 61.  See Nat’l Energy Tech. Laboratory, Tracking New Coal-Fired Power 
Plants 8 (Jan. 13, 2013) (available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/ncp.pdf 
(noting “Current Coal Capacity Additions by Years”); see also Todd Woody, Most 
Coal-Fired Power Plants in the US Are Nearing Retirement Age, 
http://qz.com/61423/coal-fired-power-plants-near-retirement/ (March 12, 2013, 
(discussing periods of capacity additions). 
 62.  The utility industry as well changed prior to the 1970s.  It began as a 
decentralized system, only to become centralized and controlled by monopolies until 
the New Deal, and thereafter it experienced an increased focus on expanding 
generation and tying generating plants into regional grids or power pools.  See 
generally Richard Rudolph & Scott Ridley, Power Struggle: The Hundred-Year War 
over Electricity (1986); Phillip F. Schewe, The Grid: A Journey Through the Heart of 
Our Electrified World (2007) (a non-technical history of how the electric grid 
developed).  “After World War II, it looked as if the electric utilities would continue, 
inevitably, on the road to lower costs and greater sales, as they did through the mid-
1960s, when the process ground to a halt with the most disastrous electrical failure in 
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with aspects of the 1970’s Carter Energy Plan, this all began to change.63   
Then, since the 1980s, the idea that monopolistic utilities, in return for a 
duty to serve customers in a defined region, would generate and transmit 
energy at cost-of-service based rates eroded significantly when policies 
fostered deregulation and promoted competitive markets over traditional 
rate regulation.64  Utility planning65 and reliability too emerged during the 
past few decades as critical components of the new paradigm.66  And so, 
 
American history.” Hyman, supra n. 56, at 151. The “happy state of affairs” for the 
industry ended in 1970s, “when the direct and indirect effects of the oil price 
revolution destabilized the entire structure.”  Edward Kahn, Electric Utility Planning 
& Regulation 1 (1988). 
 63. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 
Stat. 3117, began to frame the emerging dialogue about increased wholesale electric 
competition and restructuring.  See generally Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of 
Electricity Law, Policy, and Regulation: A Look Back, 25 Nat. Resources & Env. 33, 
34 (2010). 
 64. See Tomain, supra n. 22, at 376, 378, 382, 386–90; see generally Walter 
R. Hall III, Kenneth A. Barry, Derek Dyson, Janice Moore, Gaye White & Paul 
Breakman, History, Objectives, and Mechanics of Competitive Electricity Markets, in 
Capturing the Power of Electric Restructuring 1 (Joey L. Miranda, ed., 2009); Jim 
Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an Age of 
Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1233 (1998); 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets, 40 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 497 (2005); David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity 
Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 417 (2005). For the 
seminal early work on the dynamics of the push toward deregulation, see Paul L. 
Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electric Utility 
Deregulation (1983).  Former FERC Commissioner Donald F. Santa and his legal 
advisor Clifford S. Sikora once wrote that the 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPAct) was 
not only the first major energy legislation in over a decade, but that it changed the 
energy landscape by affording the Commission with expanded authority over 
transmission and promoting new independent market entrants—the exempt wholesale 
generators (EWGs).  Donald F. Santa & Clifford S. Sikora, New Directions at FERC, 
in Reinventing Electric Utility Regulation 363, 364 (Gregory B. Enholm & J. Robert 
Malko eds., 1995). 
 65. Prior to the 1970s, utility planning was not too difficult, as sales of 
electricity rose rather predictably; that changed by the 1970s, when “demand for 
electricity reacted to destabilizing influences, such as the unavailability of other fuels, 
environmental rules that encouraged users to take electricity instead of burning their 
own fuels, and sharply higher prices for electricity that discouraged consumption.”  
Hyman, supra n. 56, at 65. 
 66.  Reliability generally encompasses a utility or system’s “ability to react 
quickly to emergencies,” a utility or system’s ability to satisfy future electric needs 
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by the first decade of this new century, electric utilities operated in a 
fundamentally different world than they did 40 years ago. 
Several factors, however, are continuing to coalesce and reshape 
the electric utility energy market, and derivatively, coal’s future.67  To 
begin with, it is widely accepted that EPA’s various proposed, final, and 
currently litigated regulations affecting the utility sector have combined to 
cabin interest in future, newly constructed coal-fired power projects.68  
These rules include the now-vacated Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
(CSAPR),69 the Tailoring Rule for GHG emissions,70 the Mercury and 
Air Toxics Standards (MATs) Rule,71 as well as the New Source 
Performance Standards (NSPS) for GHG emissions from fossil fuel 
generating plants.72  Also, in December 2012, EPA issued a new proposed 
 
(load) for any defined area, and the dependability of customers receiving electric 
power when needed.  Hyman, supra n. 56, at 35–36. 
 67.  See generally Jessica Coomes & Andrew Childers, Low Natural Gas 
Prices, EPA Regulations Put Coal-Fired Power Plants at Crossroads, BNA Daily 
Env’t B-1 (June 6, 2012). 
 68.  See, e.g., Jessica Coomes & Andrew Childers, Power Industry Argues 
Adequate Technology Not Yet Available to Meet New EPA Rules, BNA Daily Env’t B-
1 (June 27, 2012). 
 69.  EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted in part, __ S. Ct. __, 2013 WL 1283839 (June 24, 2013). The CSAPR rule 
replaced the previously remanded 2005 Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR).  North 
Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  The Homer court directed that 
EPA continue enforcing CAIR until the agency developed a replacement rule.  696 
F.3d at 38. 
 70.  Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine 
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17004, 17009 
(Apr. 2, 2010); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010).  See Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rehearing denied, 2012 WL 
6621785 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). 
 71.  See Reconsideration of Certain New Source Issues: National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal-and Oil-Fired Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric 
Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 78 Fed. Reg. 24073 (April 24, 2013), 77 Fed. 
Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012); see also Proposed Rule; Reopening of Comment Period, 
Reconsideration of Certain Startup/Shutdown Issues, 78 Fed. 38001 (June 25, 2013). 
 72.  See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 72 Fed. Reg. 22392 (April 13, 
2012).  See generally Juliet Eilperin & Phillip Rucker, EPA May Delay Proposed 
Greenhouse Gas Limits for Power Plants, Wash. Post (March 15, 2013); Jim 
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annual national ambient air quality standard for fine particulate matter.73  
Other non-air based regulatory programs include the effort to address 
cooling water intake structures at thermal power plants pursuant to § 
316(b) of the Clean Water Act,74 as well as the ongoing debate about 
whether to regulate the disposal of coal combustion residuals (coal ash) 
from power plants pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA).75  With compliance deadlines ranging between 2013 and 
 
Efstathiou, Jr. & Mark Drajem, Coal-Burning Utilities Seek a Role in EPA Rule-
Making on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Wash. Post (Feb. 3, 2013).  EPA’s expected 
date for finalizing the rule apparently has been delayed.  See Jean Chemnick, New 
Power Plant Rule Running Late, With Major Changes Possible, E&E News (March 
18, 2013). 
 73.  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 3086 (Jan. 156, 2013). 
 74.  Section 316(b) of the CWA prescribes the use of best technology 
available for minimizing adverse environment affects from the location, design, 
construction and capacity of cooling water intake structures at thermal power plants. 
33 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).  E.g. National Pollution Discharge Elimination System—
Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and Phase I Facilities, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 22174 (April 20, 2011); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—
Final Regulations To Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at 
Phase III Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 35006 (June 16, 2006); National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water 
Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41575 (July 9, 2004); 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System—Amendment of Final Regulations 
Addressing Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 68 Fed. Reg. 36749 
(June 19, 2003).  These rules have prompted a series of challenges.  See e.g., Entergy 
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009).  Other organizations are pressing 
EPA to establish new effluent guidelines under CWA § 304(m) for power plants.  See 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Jackson, 284 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2012); Amena H. Saiyid & 
Anthony Adragna, Environmental Groups Tell OMB of Need for Effluent Guidelines 
for Power Sector, BNA Daily Env’t A-3 (March 8, 2013). 
 75.  See Appalachian Voices v. Jackson, No. 12-cv-523 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 
11, 2012).  A North Carolina study suggests that the impact on water quality from coal 
combustion residue can be significant.  Laura Ruhl, Avner Vengosh, Gary S. Dwyer, 
Heileen Hsu-Kim, Grace Schwartz, Autumn Romanski & S. Daniel Smith, The Impact 
of Coal Combustion Residue Effluent on Water Resources: A North Carolina 
Example, Envtl. Sci. & Tech. (Nov. 6, 2012). See generally Uma Outka, 
Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1679, 1706–1707 (2012) (discussing coal ash); Anthony Adragna, Restrictions 
Vary on Coal Ash Reuse, But Most States Seen Active in Regulation, BNA Daily Env’t 
(Oct. 24, 2012) (describing study Beneficial Use of Coal Combustion Residuals 
Survey Report, released by the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste 
Management Officials). Congress is considering legislation that would alter the 
regulatory program for CCR.  Linda Luther et al., Analysis of Recent Proposals To 
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2018, these various initiatives “represent the most significant 
environmental regulatory developments of the last two decades for the 
power sector.”76  Some of these initiatives triggered wide-ranging 
assessments of the potential impact on the reliability of the electric grid, if 
regulation forces switching to natural gas and the retirement of too many 
coal-fired power plants;77 most assessments, however, suggest little risk to 
reliability.78   
EPA’s new regulatory initiatives fortuitously parallel the rise of 
natural gas as the preferred fuel for electric generation.79  Over roughly 
 
Amend the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to Create A Coal 
Combustion Residuals Permit Program (Cong. Research Serv. March 19, 2013). 
 76.  Kyle W. Danish et al., Upcoming EPA Regulations and Potential 
Impact on Electric Reliability, 24 Electricity J. 7 (April 2011). 
 77.  E.g., Peter Behr, Wild Cards Lurk in the Speedy Switch to Gas-Fired 
Power Generation, E&E News (Feb. 25, 2013) (describing speech of senior vice 
present for research at the Electric Power Research Institute). 
 78.  Several prominent organizations assessed the impact of EPA’s 
regulations on the reliability of the electric utility grid.  See N. Am. Electric 
Reliability Corp., 2010 Special Reliability Scenario Assessment: Resource Adequacy 
Impacts of Potential U.S. Environmental Regulations, 
http://www.nerc.com/files/EPA_Scenario_Final.pdf (Oct. 2010); see also Analysis 
Group, The Positive Outlook for Cleaner Air and Reliable Electric Service, 
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Tierney_PositiveOu
tlook_MATSReliability_June_2012.pdf (June 11, 2012); Brattle Group, Potential 
Coal Plant Retirements Under Emerging Environmental Regulations, 
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload1082.pdf (Dec. 8, 2010, 
Updated Oct. 2012); Charles River Associates, A Reliability Assessment of EPA’s 
Proposed Transport Rule and Forthcoming Utility MACT, 
http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/CRA-Executive-Summary-
Reliability-Assessment-of-EPA’s-Proposed-Transport-Rule.pdf (Dec. 16, 2010). 
FERC issued a policy statement in May 2012, indicating how it would respond to a 
request to extend the date for compliance with the MATs rule.  See The Commission’s 
Role Regarding the Environmental Protection Agency’s Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards, 139 FERC ¶ 131 (May 17, 2012).  In July 2012, the Government 
Accountability Office issued a report suggesting that reliability is legitimate concern, 
but GOA further found that it was not as serious as some had claimed.  Government 
Accountability Off., EPA Regulations and Electricity: Better Monitoring by Agencies 
Could Strengthen Efforts to Address Potential Challenges, GAO-12-635, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592542.pdf (July 2012). 
 79.  Legions of articles portray how shale gas development is reshaping 
energy policy.  See e.g. Bryan Walsh, This Rock Could Power the World: Why Shale 
Can Solve the Energy Crisis, Time Magazine, 40 (April 2011).  See generally Henry 
D. Jacoby, Francis M. O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, The Influence of Shale Gas on 
U.S. Energy and Environmental Policy, Econ. Energy & Envtl. Policy, 2012.  The 
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the last decade, the U.S. energy resource market has dramatically changed 
as a consequence of the combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal 
drilling, as well as with the availability of major shale gas formations.80 In 
2011, the former Chairman of one of the largest electric utilities, Exelon, 
proclaimed that gas would be the benchmark fuel source and the “queen” 
for years to come.81  The International Energy Agency predicts that the 
U.S. will become the world’s largest gas producer by 2015.82  In short, 
 
ability of natural gas to serve as baseload generation is not uniformly accepted.  See 
e.g. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 Wm. & 
Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 821, 830 (2010) (“Natural gas should not be used to 
produce base load electricity.”).  Others suggest that, with appropriate storage and 
pipeline capacity, natural gas can provide base load operating characteristics.  See Joel 
Theis & Peter Balash, Key Aspects of Transitions Occurring in Electric Power 
Systems and Baseload Generation (U.S. Assoc. for Energy Econ. Working Paper No. 
12-143, 2012); see also U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electric Generator Dispatch 
Depends on System Demand and the Relative Cost of Operation, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590 (Jan. 3, 2013) (EIA suggesting 
that efficient natural gas plants can displace coal as baseload generation). 
 80.  See generally Gregory S. Mcrae & Carolyn Ruppel, The Future of 
Natural Gas: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (2011). 
 81.  See Nick Schulz, ‘The Dominant Source of Energy for Electricity’: 
Exelon CEO John Rowe on the Energy Wave of the Future, Am. Enter. Inst. (March 9, 
2011) (available at http://www.aei-ideas.org/2011/03/the-dominant-source-of-
electricity-exelon-ceo-john-rowe-on-the-energy-wave-of-the-future/); see also John 
W. Rowe, Energy Policy: Above All, Do No Harm, Am. Enter. Inst. (March 8, 2011) 
(on file with author).  Exelon owns one of the largest nuclear fleets of any utility and 
yet Rowe indicated that investment in nuclear power is uneconomic.  Jeff McMahon, 
Exelon’s “Nuclear Guy”: No New Nukes (March 29, 2012) (available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2012/03/29/exelons-nuclear-guy-no-new-
nukes/) (accessed July 13, 2013).  See also Nick Juliano, Exelon Blames Cheap Gas, 
Subsidized Wind for Sidelining Expansion Plan, E&E News (Nov. 27, 2012) (noting 
Exelon’s announcement to delay expanding its nuclear fleet). 
 82.  Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook: Executive Summary, 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf (2012). 
International Energy Agency (IEA) further predicts that gas will become the U.S.’s 
dominant overall fuel source by 2030, and that the U.S. will become close to energy 
independent by 2035.  Id. at 5.  See also Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.S. to Be World’s Top 
Oil Producer in 5 Years, Report Says, N.Y. Times (Nov. 12, 2012) (available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/business/energy-environment/report-sees-us-as-
top-oil-producer-in-5-years.html?_r=0) (accessed July 13, 2013). Some observers 
warn that low gas prices might retard investment in renewables.  See Tripp Baltz, 
Shale Gas Delays Markets for Low Emission, Renewable Technology, Report Says, 
BNA Daily Env’t (Jan. 20, 2012) (discussing International Association for Energy 
Economics report). 
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“[c]heap supplies of domestically produced natural gas are undercutting 
coal prices and usurping coal’s status as the nation’s fuel of choice for 
electric generation.”83  President Obama even issued an Executive Order 
in April 2012 promoting the nation’s exploitation of its natural gas 
resources.84 
These circumstances then converge with a host of other variables 
to make investing in new coal-fired power plants difficult.  To begin with, 
investment in new generation must reflect current and projected energy 
demand, with a sufficient reserve capacity.  But the country’s shift from a 
manufacturing to a service economy, coupled with significant gains in 
energy efficiency and the impact of the recession all contribute to a slower 
growth in electric generation demand than previously predicted.85  For a 
variety of reasons, state public utilities also may be reluctant to approve 
any new coal-fired power plant.86  Next, of course, coal plants are less 
attractive in those states that have adopted renewable portfolio standards 
designed to shift some percentage of electric generation away from fossil 
fuels and towards renewables.87 And finally, more subtle factors may 
operate: new coal-fired plants may compete ineffectively with renewables 
for transmission capacity, and market operators may begin to develop 
policies that could chill how and whether they dispatch otherwise 
inexpensive power from coal fired plants.  
 
 83.  E&E News, The Demise of Coal-Fired Power Plants, 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2012/11/26/archive/10?terms=+Coal-
Fired+Power+Plants%2C (Nov. 26, 2012). 
 84.  Supporting Safe and Responsible Development of Unconventional 
Domestic Natural Gas Resources, Exec. Or. 13605, 77 Fed. Reg. 23107 (April 13, 
2012). 
 85.  See generally Energy Info. Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 
2012, DOE/EIA-0383 (2012) (growth dropping proportionally from .3 percent per 
year from .6 percent per year); Wood Mackenzie, A Lost Decade of Demand Growth 
http://www.woodmacresearch.com/cgi-
bin/wmprod/portal/corp/corpPressDetailOpen.jsp?pass=10742820 (Aug. 21, 2012). 
 86.  See Glicksman, supra n. 7, at 523; Powers, supra n. 6, at 408. 
 87.  See generally Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: 
Is There a “Race” and is it “To the Top?” 3 San. Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 3 
(2012); Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-in 
Tariffs, 32 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 311 (2012); Joshua P. Fershee, When Prayer Trumps 
Politics: The Politics and Demographics of Renewable Portfolio Standards, 35 Wm. 
& Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 53 (2010); Jim Rossi, The Future of Energy Policy: A 
National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1425 (2010). 
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The panoply of factors influencing the paradigm for new 
generation affects utilities’ decisions for existing plants.  Some utilities 
identify the MATs rule, in particular, as forcing early retirements.  In 
February 2012, for instance, FirstEnergy invoked the MATs rule and 
announced that it was seeking to retire several of its coal-fired plants.88  
Colorado recently amended its State Implementation Plan to address 
regional haze; the plan assumes that older, less efficient coal plants will be 
replaced by natural gas.89 
Indeed, the conversation today about coal plants generally 
involves predicting the level of retirements.  EIA projects that over 8 
percent of coal-fired capacity might be shuttered by 2016.90  A report 
 
 88. See FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy, Citing Impact of Environmental 
Regulations, Will Retire Three Coal-Fired Power Plants in West Virginia, 
https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/fecorp/newsroom/news_releases/firstenergy
_citingimpactofenvironmentalregulationswillretirethre.html (Feb. 8, 2012).  Before a 
utility can retire generation, the system operator in the region must ensure that the grid 
remains reliable and the operator here requested that the plants remain on line for a 
while.  See Scott DiSavino, FirstEnergy Keeping 3 Old Ohio Coal Plants Running, 
Reuters (May 3, 2012) (available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/03/us-
utilities-firstenergy-coal-idUSBRE8420W820120503) (accessed July 13, 2013). In 
September 2012, PPL Montana similarly referenced the MATs rule when announcing 
its planned shuttering of its J.E. Corette plant.  PPL Corporation, PPL Montana 
Announces Plan to Place J.E. Corette Power Plant in Reserve Status, 
http://pplweb.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=12270&item=133034 (Sept. 19, 2012); 
see also E&E News, Minnesota Power Will Switch to Natural Gas (Jan. 31, 2013). 
 89.  Scott Streater, EPA Grants Final Approval to Colo. Haze Plan Focused 
on Energy Producers, 
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2012/09/11/archive/2?terms=streater News (Sept. 
11, 2012). Environmental advocates, for instance, are challenging Wyoming’s 
regional haze program (Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; 
State of Wyoming; Regional Haze Rule Requirements for Mandatory Class I Areas, 
77 Fed. Reg. 73926 (Dec. 12, 2012), claiming that the plan does not go far enough to 
reduce emissions from coal plants.  See KGOS-AM/KERM-FM, Environmental 
Group Challenges Wyoming Haze Management, 
http://www.kgoskerm.com/news/regional-news/stories/650-environmental-group-
challenges-wyoming-haze-management  (March 6, 2013).  A similar challenge exists 
against Colorado’s haze plan.  Manuel Quinones, Group Challenges EPA’s Approval 
of Colo. Haze Plan, E&E News (Feb. 26, 2013).  A tentative agreement between New 
Mexico and EPA that would shutter some coal-fired plants might avert a similar 
challenge there.  See Jason Plautz, EPA, N.M. Haze Deal Requires Coal-Fired Power 
Plant’s Shift to Gas, E&E News (Feb. 18, 2013). 
 90.  See Alan Kovski, EIA Says 8.5 Percent of Coal-Fired Capacity In U.S. 
To Shut Down Over Next Five Years, BNA Daily Env’t A-13 (July 30, 2012). 
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from the Brattle Group suggests that utilities expect to retire between 57 
and 77 Gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired electric capacity (many of the older, 
smaller plants) by 2016.91  And the Union of Concerned Scientists reports 
that, as of May 2012, 288 coal-fired power plants were scheduled for 
closure, with a possible 153 to 353 additional plants that might be ripe for 
retirement.92  The trade press now seems replete with articles about the 
retirement of coal plants.93  In October 2012, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, for instance, announced that it would dedicate $775 million 
toward natural gas power plants, switching away from having coal serve 
as its dominant fuel source.94    
The campaign to explore further options under the CAA to reduce 
GHG emissions from existing coal-fired generation continues.  In 
December 2012, the Natural Resources Defense Council suggested that 
the administration could deploy § 111(d) of the CAA to regulate existing 
power plants.95  This provision would allow EPA to require that states 
control GHG emissions from existing and unmodified section 111(b) 
 
 91.  Metin Celebi, Frank Graves, & Charles Russell, Potential Coal Plant 
Retirements: 2012Update, 
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload1082.pdf (Oct. 2012). 
 92.  Rachel Cleetus et al., The Case for Closing America’s Costliest Coal 
Plants, www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/Ripe-for-Retirement-
Executive-Summary.pdf (Nov. 2012); see also Nathanael Massey, As Economy Turns 
Against Coal, 100 GW of Generating Capacity May be at Risk, E&E News (Nov. 13, 
2012); Manuel Quinones, 6% of U.S. Power Plants “Ripe for Retirement” – Report, 
E&E News (Nov. 13, 2012). 
 93.  See, e.g. Jessica Coomes & Andrew Childers, As Older Coal-Fired 
Power Plants Retire, Shift to Natural Gas Expected to Accelerate, BNA Daily Env’t 
(June 29, 2012); Daniel Cusick, Aging Coal-Fired Plants, Coal Prices Send Big 
Independent Power Producer into Bankruptcy, E&E News (Dec. 18, 2012); Daniel 
Cusick, Sagging Economy, Doubts About Coal Prompt Power Companies to Sell 
More Plants, E&E News (Sept. 14, 2012); Manuel Quinones, AEP to Close Ky. Coal-
Fired Power Plant, E&E News (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 94.  See Tom Charlier, Coal No Longer King in TVA Region As More Gas-
Fired Plants Used to Generate Electricity, 
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/oct/08/coal-no-longer-king-in-tva-
region-as-more-gas-to/ (Oct. 8, 2012). 
 95.  Nat. Resources Def. Council, Using the Clean Air Act to Sharply 
Reduce Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants, Creating Clean Energy Jobs, 
Improving Americans’ Health, and Curbing Climate Chang, 
http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/pollution-standards-IB.pdf (Dec. 
2012). 
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stationary sources.96  It is yet to be determined whether, or how, EPA will 
address existing power plants, but several proponents of increased 
regulation suggest a desire for a technology forcing approach.97 
III. COAL’S CHIMERA? 
The coal industry generally has responded to these external 
pressures on coal consumption by focusing on expanding coal exports to 
feed a hungry Asian market.98  The principle is simple.  If the United 
States reduces its coal consumption,99 then it can ship excess coal supply 
to countries still building new coal-fired electric plants.  After all, the 
United States enjoys sufficient coal supplies to last over 200 years.100  
 
 96.  CAA § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006).  See Robert R. Nordhaus, 
Modernizing the Clean Air Act: Is There Life After 40? 33 Energy L.J. 365, 385 
(2012) (suggesting that 111(d) may not work well, particularly for other than large 
stationary sources).  Some authors suggest that further efficiency gains might be 
available from existing sources at low cost.  See Joshua Linn, Erin Mastrangelo & 
Dallas Burtraw, Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants under the 
Clean Air Act 30 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper, 2012) (available at 
http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-11-43-REV.pdf). 
 97.  E.g., Jean Chemnick, Browner Urges EPA to Write “Technology 
Forcing” Rule for Power Plants, E&E News (Feb. 8, 2013). 
 98.  See generally Debra Bruna, Natural Gas Isn’t Likely to Extinguish 
China’s Love Affair With Coal, E&E News (Oct. 26, 2012); Felicia Resor, Heat 
Exchange: Efforts to Increase Wyoming Coal Exports Turns the Heat Up on Legal 
Changes to Impacts Both Local and Global, Wyofile, 
http://wyofile.com/2012/05/heat-exchange-efforts-to-increase-wyoming-coal-exports-
turns-the-heat-up-on-legal-challenges-to-impacts-both-local-and-global/ (May 22, 
2012); Note, Gas Boom, While Lowering Emissions in U.S., Shifts Coal to Europe – 
Study, E&E News (Nov. 1, 2012) (noting that more than half of U.S. exports went to 
Europe).  To date, most of the U.S. coal exports have been bituminous coal from the 
east, and most of the PRB coal has been exported to Europe.  Resor, supra.  Australia 
too has become somewhat dependent upon its export of commodities, including coal, 
to Asian markets.  See Steve LeVine, Australia’s Resource-Based Economy Swallows 
A Bitter Pill as Coal Prices Drop, E&E News (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 99.  IEA suggests that, by 2017, U.S. coal demand will fall from 697 
million metric tons to 600 million metric tons.  See Manual Quinones, Coal Demand 
up Everywhere But in the U.S. – Report, E&E News (Dec. 18, 2012) (discussing 
IEA’s December 2012 Medium-Term Coal Market Report). 
 100.  See U. S. Energy Info. Administration, What Is the Role of Coal In the 
United States? http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/role_coal_us.cfm (accessed 
July 20, 2103). 
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And worldwide coal consumption is growing.101  By 2017, world coal 
consumption will increase by approximately 1 billion tons.102  China has 
become the largest importer of coal, recently replacing Japan.103   Since 
2000, China is responsible for roughly 82 percent of the world’s increase 
in coal consumption, and now consumes approximately the same amount 
of coal as the rest of the combined world.104  Even so, Japan is still 
aggressively pursuing fossil fuel imports and it has increased its import of 
 
 101.  See E&E News, China, India Will Continue to Drive High Demand 
(Nov. 14, 2012).  Europe’s coal demand remains high, to the degree that the 
Economist described it as still experiencing a golden age of coal.  The Economist, 
Europe’s Dirty Secret: Europe’s Energy Policy Delivers the Worst of All Possible 
Worlds, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21569039-europes-energy-policy-
delivers-worst-all-possible-worlds-unwelcome-renaissance (Jan. 5, 2013).  E.g., Paul 
Homewood, Germany to Open Six More Coal Power Stations in 2013, 
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2013/04/23/germany-to-open-six-more-coal-power-
stations-in-2013/ (accessed July 13, 2013). 
 102.  E&E News, Coal Consumption to Rise Globally Despite Drop in U.S., 
IEA Says, www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2012/12/18/1 (Dec. 18, 2012). 
 103.  Id.  “China, now the world’s largest coal producer and consumer, will 
lead the world’s growth over the next five years along with India,” and “will make it 
the largest seaborne coal importer and second largest consumer.”  Manuel Quinones, 
Coal Demand Up Everywhere But in the U.S. – Report, E&E News (Dec. 18, 2012).  
China’s energy demand is so great that, while it has announced an aggressive plan for 
developing approximately 11 percent of its energy resources from renewables by 
2015, it must continue to expand its use of fossil fuel as well.  See Leslie A. Pappas, 
China to Add 49 Gigawatts of Renewable Energy Capacity This Year, Agency Says, 
BNA Daily Env’t A-14 (Jan. 10, 2013) (describing White Paper issued by the 
National Energy Administration). 
 104.  Daniel Cusck, China’s Soaring Coal Consumption Approaches the 
Combined Use of All Other Nations, E&E News (Jan. 30, 2013).  Countervailing 
reports, however, suggest that China’s coal imports may not be sustainable.  See 
Daniel Cusick, China’s Imports May Peak Then Plummet Before 2020—Study, E&E 
News (Feb. 8, 2013); Manuel Quinones, Industry Overly Optimistic About Chinese 
Demand—Greenpeace, E&E News (Feb. 27, 2013). In 2010, Stanford’s Program on 
Energy and Sustainable Development explained how China’s “restructuring of its coal 
and power sectors” is dramatically affecting the world market.  Dr. Huaichaunan Rui, 
et al., Remaking the World’s Largest Coal Market: The Quest to Develop Large Coal-
Power Bases in China (Program on Energy & Sust. Dev., Stanford, Working Paper 
No. 98, Dec. 2010) (available at http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/23050/WP_98%2C_Rui%2C_He%2C_Morse_China_Coal_Pow
er_Bases_DEC10.pdf) (accessed July 13, 2013). 
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coal.105  Although India sits on untapped coal deposits, it, too, is 
desperately working to expand its generation capacity and could become 
the world’s largest coal importer by 2020.106 
 A.The Ports 
  Several different proposals have surfaced for increasing west coast 
port capacity to handle increased exports.  Most notably, in 2011, Ambre 
Energy acquired the site for the Millennium Bulk Terminals in Longview, 
Washington (MBTL), located on the Columbia River, and is jointly 
promoting the terminal with its partner, Arch Coal.  The MBTL would 
export up to 44 million metric tons annually.  Peabody Coal has promoted 
exporting 48 million metric tons annually from the Puget Sound Gateway 
Pacific Terminal, located at Cherry Point, eight miles from Bellingham, 
Washington.  The Port Morrow Pacific Project on the Columbia River, 
located near Boardman, Oregon, would receive by rail roughly 8.8 million 
tons of coal from the PRB; the project contemplates that the coal would be 
shipped by barge to a facility at Port of St. Helens and then loaded onto 
ships destined to Asian markets.  Other projects include Kinder Morgan’s 
Port Westward proposal at Port of St. Helens,107 as well as the planned 
project at Coos Bay, one of the largest deep draft harbors along the 
northwest coast.108 
But a vibrant and vocal campaign against increased capacity for 
coal exports has emerged.109  Local communities worry about greater rail 
 
 105.  See Mari Iwata, Japan’s Fossil-Fuel Needs Test the New Government, 
Wall St. J. (Jan. 24, 2013); Toshio Aritake, Japanese Panel Urges More Generation 
From Coal to Fill Gap Left by Nuclear Retreat, BNA Daily Env’t A-9 (April 4, 2013). 
 106.  Simon Denyer & Rama Lakshmi, Satisfying India’s Thirst for Power 
Could Be Nation’s Biggest Challenge, Wash. Post (Aug. 22, 2012). India’s pollution 
from coal-fired generation reportedly has contributed annually up to 115,000 
premature deaths, costing the country roughly $4.6 billion.  Lisa Friedman, In India, 
Coal-Fired Energy Leads to 115,000 Premature Deaths Each Year—Study, E&E 
News (March 11, 2013). 
 107.  Kinder Morgan, Port Westward Project, 
http://portwestwardproject.com (accessed July 13, 2013). 
 108.  EarthFix, How Coal Helped Build the Port of Coos Bay, 
http://earthfix.opb.org/energy/article/how-coal-helped-build-the-port-of-coos-bay/ 
(April 18, 2012). 
 109.  See, e.g., The Power Past Coal, http://www.powerpastcoal.org 
(accessed July 13, 2013); Coal Export Action group, http://coalexportaction.org 
(accessed July 13, 2013).  See also Natl. Wildlife Federation, The True Cost of Coal: 
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traffic through their neighborhoods, concerned about noise, safety, and 
potential health effects from coal dust flying off the rail cars.110  These 
communities have convened public hearings to voice their opposition, 
even though they can exercise little regulatory control over the outcome of 
these proposed projects.111  Others emphasize the potential impact on 
coastal resources, as well as the downstream GHG emissions once the coal 
reaches its destination and is utilized in power plants.  The northwestern 
state politicians generally have responded to the local opposition by 
expressing concern about increased exports, a significant obstacle given 
the patchwork of federal and state regulatory requirements that will need 
 
The Coal Industry’s Threat to Fish and Communities in the Pacific Northwest, 
http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/GlobalWarming/Reports/NWF_PacificCoal_FINA
L.ashx (2012).  A similar examination into the effects of increased northwest port 
capacity occurred during the early 1980s, when the country previously witnessed 
expanding exports.  See Kramer, Chin & Mayo, Inc., Potential Coal Export Facilities 
in Washington: An Environmental Impact Analysis (1982) (on file with author). 
 110.  See Nathanael Massey, Coal Dust from Rail Cars Raises Liability 
Questions, E&E News (March 11, 2013). Several organizations recently filed a 
lawsuit alleging that the coal dust from the trains violates the Clean Water Act, when 
that dust lands in waters of the United States.  Sierra Club, et al. v. BNSF Railway 
Co., et al., Complaint, 13-cv-00967 (W.D. Wash. June 4, 2013).  Cf. Alaska 
Community Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Services, LLC, 2013 WL 1614436 (D. 
Alaska March 28, 2013) (Clean Water Act re coal). Coal’s utilization has been 
inextricably tied to the railroad industry.  “The problem of how to transport [coal] 
efficiently is nearly as old as our romance with coal.”  Jeff Goodell, Big Coal: The 
Dirty Secret behind American’s Energy Future 75 (2006).  On the one hand, coal-
mining companies appear to be working cooperatively with the railroads to promote 
exports.  This is understandable, because the decline in coal traffic adversely affects 
their revenues.  Daniel Cusick, Coal’s Hard Times are Felt by the Nation’s Railroads, 
E&E News (Aug. 9, 2012). 
 111.  Coal Age, Additional Environmental and Federal Oversight to Delay 
Development of West Coast Coal Ports, 
http://www.coalage.com/index.php/news/latest/2327-additional-environmental-and-
federal-oversight-to-delay-development-of-west-coast-coal-ports.html 
(Oct. 14, 2012).  At public hearings convened by the COE, the overwhelming majority 
of speakers opposed the export facilities.  Paul Shukovsky, Opponents of Proposed 
Terminal for Shipping Coal to Asia Call for EIS Covering Wider Area, BNA Daily 
Env’t A-1 (Oct. 30, 2012).  While local opposition undoubtedly contributed to some 
of these projects being abandoned, local opposition has not prevented state agencies 
from continuing the permitting process for Ambre Energy’s Morrow Pacific Project.  
See Nathanael Massey, State Regulators Advance Permitting Process for Ore. Coal 
Terminal, E&E News (June 4, 2013). 
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to be navigated.112 Oregon’s Senator Jeff Merkley, for instance, suggested 
that these federal agencies conduct a comprehensive programmatic 
assessment of coal export facilities.113  The State’s governor, John 
Kitzhaber, similarly requested a comprehensive study.114  Some of the 
proposed projects, therefore, have stalled: during the 2012 summer, the 
proponents of the Port of Grays Harbor proposal announced that they were 
abandoning plans to build that storage and export facility.115   
 B.Programmatic Reviews, Federal Coal Leasing & GHG Emissions 
Federal agencies, too, have become critical players in the 
conversation about coal exports. Unlike with the export of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) or cross-border oil pipelines (such as the proposed 
Keystone XL project), no federal agency is charged specifically with 
determining whether the national interest warrants allowing coal 
exports.116  This regulatory void has prompted coal’s opponents to 
 
 112.  See generally Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change, 
Carbon Offshoring: The Legal and Regulatory Framework for U.S. Coal Exports, 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=
59591 (July 2011).  States can review any federal authorization for consistency with 
the state’s enforceable policies in an approved coastal management program, 16 
U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2006), and a state can deny a Clean Water Act § 401 certification if 
it finds that the activity may result in a discharge that is inconsistent with a state water 
quality program.  33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006). 
 113.  Merkley Calls for Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on 
Coal Projects in Oregon, 
http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=88ec36c8-e3a4-4bdf-
977f-246c98e7b0a7 (July 18, 2012).  Other Senators suggest that the agencies 
examine the proposals on a project-by-project basis, consistent with the existing 
agency practice.  See Manuel Quinones, Wyo. Senators Urge Approval of Proposed 
Northwest Terminals, E&E News (Aug. 3, 2012) (describing letter to the agencies). 
 114.  Nathanael Massey, Ore.’s Governor Wants Comprehensive Study of 
Export-Site Impacts, E&E News (April 27, 2012).  The Affiliated Tribes of the 
Northwest Indians also requested a comprehensive analysis of the cumulative effects 
occasioned by increased northwest exports.  See Jessie Higgins, Tribes Request Coal 
Export Study, http://theworldlink.com/news/local/tribes-request-coal-export-
study/article_3907f0c7-7a6c-5271-ad63-08b82e25d7a3.html (Oct. 30, 2012). 
 115.  Manuel Quinones, Company Cancels Pacific Northwest Shipping 
Plans, E&E News (Aug. 15, 2012). 
 116.  See infra nn. 126–131 (for LNG export facilities); Issuance of Permits 
with Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land Transportation Crossings 
on the International Boundaries of the United States, Exec. Or. 13337, 69 Fed. Reg. 
25299, 25299 (May 5, 2004) (for cross-border oil pipelines). 
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explore possible avenues for programmatic review: exploring the 
cumulative effect of increased railway and barge traffic, the cumulative 
effect on the coastal communities and ecosystems, and the cumulative 
effect on GHG emissions from the overseas burning of coal.  Two 
avenues, in particular, have surfaced.  First, new or expanded ports require 
review and approval by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE).  
Second, much of the coal, particularly in the PRB, is on federal public 
land, with leasing and mining activities regulated by federal agencies.  
Both of these areas of federal involvement present likely arenas for 
exploring the macro-issue of increased coal exports.   
To date, the COE has become the primary agency charged with 
reviewing the array of effects precipitated by increased coal exports 
pursuant to the NEPA.117  NEPA requires the preparation of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) for any major federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.118 NEPA, as 
it has been interpreted, is designed to ensure that agencies reach informed 
decisions about the environmental consequences of pursuing a proposed 
action, with a meaningful opportunity for public participation and review, 
by taking a “hard look” at the environmental and related effects before 
embarking upon the action.119  NEPA also requires that the agency review 
a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed action, before it 
proceeds.120 
The COE determined that the largest of the proposed terminal 
projects, the Gateway Pacific Terminal, located north of Bellingham, 
Washington and just shy of the Canadian border, requires the preparation 
of an EIS.  Conversely, the COE determined that the smaller Port Morrow 
 
 117.  42 U.S.C. § 4321–4335 (2006). 
 118.  42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006)).  See Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 15-16, 23 (2008); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1989). 
 119.  555 U.S. at 23; see also id. at 35 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), 47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing informational and 
participatory purposes).  See also Brodsky v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 704 
F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing public participation).  While NEPA is considered 
a procedural statute, I have argued elsewhere that the intent of the Act reflects a much 
more complicated picture.  Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes of Age: NEPA’s Lost 
Mandate, 21 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 113 (2010). 
 120.  42 U.SC. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2006); see also Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 704 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2013) (“NEPA requires . . . 
consideration of reasonable alternatives”). 
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project could be “fast tracked” by completing an environmental 
assessment (EA) rather than a longer and more complex EIS. 
The COE’s approach to the Port Morrow proposal triggered a 
negative reaction from EPA, with EPA suggesting that the COE prepare 
an EIS in lieu of an EA.121  EPA specifically lodged concern over the 
potential health effects from project-related coal dust and diesel emissions, 
as well as the contribution to cumulatively significant impacts from at 
least five other such port projects.122  The agency suggested that the COE 
should consider “the cumulative impacts to human health and the 
environment from increases in greenhouse gas emissions, rail traffic, 
mining activity on public lands, and the transport of ozone, particulate 
matter, and mercury from Asia to the United States.”123  This led EPA 
Region 10 to suggest that the COE prepare “a thorough and broadly-
scoped cumulative impacts analysis of exporting large quantities of 
Wyoming and Montana-mined coal through the west coast of the United 
States to Asia,” and that this analysis—almost, in effect, a programmatic 
EIS—should become the focal point for integrating other review and 
consultation requirements triggered by the port projects.124  In May 2013, 
 
 121.  Memo from Kate Kelly, Director, Office of Ecosystems, Tribal and 
Public Affairs, U.S. Envtl. Protec. Agency, Region 10, to Steve Gagnon, Project 
Manager, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Comments on Public Notice for Permit 
Application under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act for a Coal Transloading 
Facility, Port of Morrow, Oregon, 
http://media.oregonlive.com/environment_impact/other/EPA%20letter%20about%20P
EIS.PDF (April 5, 2012). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 2.  CEQ currently is considering finalizing draft guidance 
addressing how agencies could or should consider climate change when preparing 
NEPA documents. See Council on Envt’l Quality, Draft Guidance for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Climate Change Impacts,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/nepa/ghg-guidance 
(accessed July 10, 2013). 
 124.  Memo from Kate Kelly, supra n. 121, at 3.  EPA Region 10 specifically 
stopped short of suggesting a programmatic EIS, however.  Scott Learn, Northwest 
Coal Export Projects Could Have “Significant” Public Health Impacts, EPA Says, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2012/04/northwest_coal_export_pr
ojects.html (April 13, 2012).  In other instances, EPA has suggested that area wide 
programmatic statements might be appropriate.  See Memo from Thomas C. Welborn, 
Chief, Wetlands Coastal and Oceans Branch & Heinz Mueller, Chief, NEPA Program, 
U.S. Envtl. Protec. Agency, Region 4, to Colonel Alfred A. Pantano, Jr., District 
Eng’r, Jacksonville District Corps of Eng’rs, Need for Area Wide Environmental 
Impact Statement: “Bone Valley” Phosphate Mining Region (Peace River Watershed, 
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EarthJustice expanded upon EPA’s position and filed a petition with the 
COE, requesting that the COE undertake an area-wide EIS.125 
This debate over the breadth of environmental review for coal 
exports partially mirrors an effort to expand the scope of environmental 
review associated with liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals.126  
Some courts currently appear reluctant to require detailed analysis of the 
possible effects of burning the LNG in foreign markets.127  The same 
appears true for induced effects of increased shale gas development in the 
United States, if the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
approves new pipelines being built to transport the LNG to foreign ports 
for export.128  Yet, while the possible effect on U.S. consumers captures 
most of the attention on LNG exports,129 the Sierra Club also argues that 
 
Florida), http://protectpeaceriver.org/resources/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/EPA-
Recommendation-for-Areawide-EIS.pdf (March 10, 2010). 
 125.  Petition to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Petition to 
Undertake Area-Wide Environmental Impact Statement on All Proposed Coal Export 
Terminals in Washington and Oregon (May 22, 2013) (on file with author). 
 126.  FERC must approve the construction of the facilities, and the DOE 
must approve a long-term authorization for export.  DOE authorization is not required 
for export transactions less than two years.  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2006); 10 
C.F.R. Ch. II, Subch. G, Pt. 590 (2012) (DOE regulations).  To the extent that a 
blanket exporter does not require any structural changes to its facility, but rather only 
requires operational changes, the DOE has applied categorical exclusions to some of 
these transactions.  See Comment on Record of Categorical Exclusion (CX) 
Determination, FE Dkt. No. 10-110-LNG, 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/10_110_CX.pdf, (U.S. Dept. of 
Energy Dec. 2, 2010) (noting application of exclusion for Sempra LNG Marketing, 
LLC).  See generally Sean Dixon, Liquefied Natural Gas Exports and Export 
Facilities: A Statutory Framework, 43 Trends (newsltr. of the ABA Sec. Envr., 
Energy, & Resources) 6 (July/August 2012). 
 127.  E.g., South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 
1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (“FERC’s analysis was reasonably thorough, given 
circumstances that suggest a significant amount of uncertainty regarding the issue of 
the ultimate impact of burning imported natural gas delivered by North Baja.”). 
 128.  Central New York Oil and Gas Co., LLC, 138 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,104 (U.S. 
F.E.R.C. 2012), petition for review denied, 485 Fed. Appx. 472 (2nd Cir. 2012) 
(unpublished order).  See also Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC, 141 F.E.R.C. 
¶ 61,091 (U.S. F.E.R.C.2012) (FERC not required to examine in detail induced shale 
gas development); see also Ellen M. Gilmer, River Agency Rejects Call to Consider 
Pipelines’ Broad Effects, E&E News (Dec. 7, 2012). 
 129.  See Notice of Availability of 2012 LNG Export Study and Request for 
Comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 73627 (Dec. 11, 2012).  Several congressional members 
have voiced concerns over LNG exports.  See Cong. Markey to Secretary Chu, May 8, 
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either the DOE or the FERC should address the cumulative environmental 
impact associated with approving individual or multiple LNG export 
facilities.130  To date, efforts to force a programmatic assessment of the 
cumulative effects of increased unconventional gas development have 
proven unsuccessful.131 
The same fate appears quite possible for proponents of a 
comprehensive analysis of coal exports.  An expanded world market for 
western coal shipped from the Pacific Northwest undoubtedly will affect 
decisions regarding the leasing and development of federal coal, the 
amount of rail traffic, and ultimately the amount of emissions from coal 
use.  But it seems questionable whether the COE is institutionally capable 
of assessing the panoply of issues and rendering an effective policy 
decision.  Apparently attempting to coordinate the federal agencies’ views 
on the scope of any environmental review, the Council on Environmental 
Quality reportedly convened a meeting on August 10, 2012.132  Whatever 
the contents of that meeting, the COE recently indicated in testimony 
before Congress that it would not prepare any programmatic EIS and 
would avoid examining the GHG emissions that might occur in overseas 
coal markets.133  To date, nothing suggests that the COE’s position 
reflects an Administration consensus.   
 
2012 (on file with author); Press Release, Wyden: U.S. Should Reconsider Rubber 
Stamping LNG Exports as Part of a 21st-Century Energy Policy, 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-us-should-reconsider-
rubber-stamping-lng-exports-as-part-of-a-21st-century-energy-policy (Nov. 2, 2012); 
see generally Hannah Northey, Markey Wants Do-over of DOE Study on Exports, 
http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/rss/2012/12/18/6 (Dec. 18, 2012).  Cf. Hannah 
Northey, Western Lawmakers Urge Chu to Fast-track Review of Export Projects, 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2012/09/25/ (Sept. 25, 2012). 
 130.  Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC & Sabine Pass LNG, L.P., Order 
Denying Rehearing and Stay, 139 FERC ¶ 61,039 (U.S. FERC July 26, 2012); Sierra 
Club’s Mot. to Intervene Out of Time, Protest, and Comments, In Re Sabine Pass 
Liquefaction, LLC & Sabine Pass LNG, L.P.(U.S. Dept. of Energy, Off. of Fossil 
Energy Undated) (FE Docket No. 10-111-LNG) (on file with author). 
 131.  See Craig Segall, Sierra Club, Look Before the LNG Leap: Why 
Policymakers and the Public Need Fair Disclosure Before Exports of Fracked Gas 
Start, http://www.sierraclub.org/naturalgas/downloads/LOOK-BEFORE-YOU-
LEAP.pdf (accessed July 10, 2013). 
 132.  Paul Shukovsky, White House Intervenes in Dispute Over Plans to 
Export Coal to Asia Through Northwest, BNA Daily Env’t A-16 (Oct. 4, 2012). 
 133.  Hal Bernton, Seattle Times, Corps Review Won’t Weigh Impact of Coal 
Beyond NW, , 
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Whether or not proponents of an expanded COE’s scope of review 
for coal exports are successful, the federal coal leasing process provides 
yet another forum for exploring a broader review of exports.  One 
environmental advocate, for instance, suggests that the “main threat” of 
increased coal exports is from the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) 
“selling mining rights to an estimated 3.7 billion tons of Power River 
Basin coal.”134  Recent estimates suggest that the Powder River Basin 
contains more than 1 trillion short tons of coal reserves.135  Examining the 
leasing process, therefore, could become the next logical avenue for 
addressing coal’s long-term prospects.  Before the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) can issue coal leases, it must comply with NEPA by 
analyzing an appropriate range of alternatives and the environmental 
impacts of its leasing decision.136  The question is whether this review 
must or ought to include a review of the impacts of utilizing the coal—
particularly in Asian markets?  Several organizations have sought to force 
BLM and the USFS to examine the climate change impacts triggered by 
the leasing activity, and not just project the resulting emissions levels from 
both mining and utilizing the coal.137  While standing has become 
 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021218066_coalterminalshearingxml.html.  
(June 18, 2013). 
 134.  Ted Williams, Kicking the Coal Habit, Audubon Magazine 81, 98 
(May-June 2012). 
 135.  Manuel Quinones, Region’s Coal Reserves Top 1 T Tons—USGS, E&E 
News (Feb. 26, 2013) (reporting on USGS February 2013 estimate). 
 136.  See supra nn. 116–119 and accompanying text.  The U.S. Forest 
Service must issue its consent to a lease for lands it administers.  30 U.S.C. § 
201(a)(3)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 137.  In their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs assert: 
 BLM’s consideration of climate impacts from its Leasing 
authorizations falls short in three ways.  First, BLM failed to 
analyze direct impacts to climate from CO2 emissions from coal 
mining activities on the Leases.  Second, BLM failed to analyze 
impacts to climate from cumulative CO2 emissions from coal 
mining activities on the Leases in combination with coal mining 
activities on 10 other Federal coal leases in Wyoming’s PRB.  
Third, BLM failed to analyze the indirect impacts to climate from 
CO2 emissions caused by combustion of the Belle Ayr North and 
Caballo West coal in combination with coal combustion from 10 
other Federal coal leases.  Instead, the agency attempted to excuse 
its lack of meaningful analysis on the basis of alleged complexities 
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problematic for some of these climate change related claims,138 the issue 
of the scope of environmental review is likely to remain at the forefront.  
 C.Constrained by Coal’s Earlier Entanglement with NEPA? 
The issue surrounding the scope of review surfaces because of the 
perceived difference between how comprehensively an agency can 
perform a cumulative impact analysis in a project-specific case and what 
that same agency can review when it prepares a programmatic 
environmental analysis.  Arguably, a programmatic review can include 
upstream and downstream environmental, cultural, and economic effects, 
and provide a better avenue for deciding significant policy issues.139  
After all, the DOI has engaged in programmatic reviews for the 
development of wind,140 solar,141 and geothermal resources on the public 
lands.142  It similarly develops a programmatic environmental document 
 
and uncertainties as to future regulation of CO2 emissions and 
climate impacts. 
Pl.’s Mot. for S.J., WildEarth Guardians, et. al. v. BLM, No. 11-CV-01481, slip op. at 
30 (D.D.C. Filed Dec. 13, 2012).  A similar challenge exists for the USFS’s consent to 
activities within the Thunder Basin National Grassland, in Wyoming.  Compl. for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petit. for Rev. of Agency Action, WildEarth 
Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 11-03171 (D. Colo. Filed Dec. 6, 2011), 
transferred to D. Wy. (April 24, 2012) 
 138.  See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians, et. al. v. Salazar, 880 F. Supp. 2d 77 
(D.D.C. 2012) (dismissed NEPA claims on standing), appeal pending, WildEarth 
Guardians et. al. v. Salazar, Case No. 12-5312 (D.C. Cir.). 
 139.  The D.C. Circuit explained that such a review “reflects the broad 
environmental consequences attendant upon a wide-ranging federal program,” and it 
assumes that “a systematic program is likely to generate disparate yet related 
impacts.”  Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Appalachian Reg’l Comm’n, 677 F.2d 883, 888 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)). 
 140. Bureau of Land Mgt., Wind Energy Development Programmatic EIS 
Information Center, http://windeis.anl.gov (accessed July 10, 2013). 
 141.   Bureau of Land Mgt., Solar Energy Development Programmatic EIS 
Information Center, http://solareis.anl.gov (accessed July 10, 2013). 
 142. Bureau of Land Mgt., Geothermal Resources Leasing Programmatic 
EIS, 
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/geothermal/geothermal_nationwide.html 
(last accessed July 10, 2013). But cf. Cal. Wilderness Coalition v. Dept. of Energy, 
631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (agency violated NEPA by failing to prepare 
environmental document for national interest electric transmission corridors); Nevada 
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for oil and gas leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf.143  Indeed, when 
agencies have identified cumulative effects to certain ecosystems, they 
have prepared programmatic documents designed to facilitate coordinated 
planning.144   And CEQ’s regulations contemplate that agencies will 
prepare a single environmental document when actions are “connected,” 
“cumulative,” or “similar,” warranting consideration in a single 
document.145  A classic example is the COE’s Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for the issuance of nationwide 
permits under the Clean Water Act Section 404 (wetlands) program.146  
But an agency cannot be forced to prepare a programmatic document, 
unless the agency specifically proposes a programmatic action—at least, 
arguably, according to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kleppe v. Sierra 
Club.147  
 
v. Dept. of Energy, 457 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (NEPA PEIS for Yucca Mountain 
project). 
 143.  See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgt., Outer Continental Shelf Oil and 
Gas Leasing Program: 2012-2017: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement, http://www.boem.gov/5-Year/2012-2017/PEIS.aspx (July 2012); see also 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(discussing challenge to programmatic leasing plan). 
 144. E.g. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement: Florida Keys Water Quality Improvements Program 
(2004); U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, Biomass Crop 
Assistance Program Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (2010); 
Columbia River Ecosystem Study; Laub v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (noting PEIS for the management of the California Bay-Delta water 
resources). 
 145.  40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (2012).  If an agency prepares a PEIS, it may 
then “tier” off that document by preparing subsequent smaller NEPA documents that 
incorporate by reference information contained in the PEIS.  40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.28 
(defining tiering), 1502.20 (encouraging tiering), 1502.21 (incorporation by 
reference).  As a consequence, the PEIS need not include all site-specific impacts that 
will be analyzed later, if to do so in the PEIS is not reasonably possible.  See Pacific 
Rivers Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 689 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2012).  For 
the use of tiering in the offshore oil and gas leasing program, see Sam Kalen, The BP 
Macondo Well Exploration Plan: Wither the Coastal Zone Management Act?, 40 
Envtl. L. Rep. 11079, 11082-3 (2010); Sam Kalen, Ryan M. Seideman, James G. 
Wilkins & Megan K. Terrell, Lingering Relevance of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act to Energy Development in Our Nation’s Waters? 24 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 73, 95 (2010). 
 146.  E.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 13782 (March 22, 1999) (notice of proposed scoping 
for programmatic EIS). 
 147.  Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 390 (1976).  For a discussion of Kleppe, see Sam 
Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the Nation’s 
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Kleppe involved the U.S.’s early effort to develop a national coal 
program.  By the early 1970s, the Department had been leasing federal 
coal resources on an ad hoc basis.148  In 1971, the Department stopped 
issuing any new coal leases or permits until it could develop a modern 
federal coal leasing program.149  Two years later, the Department issued a 
formal moratorium, announcing that it would develop a federal coal 
program and prepare an accompanying EIS.150  The Department released 
its EIS on the national program in 1975, and in the following year it 
proposed the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System 
(EMARS).  Concurrently, Secretary Kleppe announced that the 
Department would develop a programmatic EIS and, among other things, 
establish a Northern Great Plains coal resource program.151  
While these events were occurring, another lawsuit proceeded 
apace.  Filed in June of 1973, a lawsuit challenged the DOI’s failure to 
prepare a regional EIS covering northeastern Wyoming, eastern Montana, 
and the western parts of North and South Dakota (together referred to as 
the Northern Great Plains).  Although the DOI had agreed to prepare a 
national programmatic EIS and intimated that it would likely prepare site-
specific EIS’s for particular leases, it concluded that no EIS was required 
at the regional level, because DOI had neither undertaken nor proposed to 
undertake any particular “plan” or “program” covering a particular region.  
DOI later explained that it was concerned that any regional programmatic 
document might halt any new lease sales or mine plan approvals until the 
 
Environmental Policy, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 483, 524–530 (2009); 
Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: 
A Reappraisal and Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 Geo. L.J. 1507, 1541 (2012).  And 
agencies enjoy discretion when deciding whether to prepare a PEIS.  See Nevada v. 
Dept. of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Izaak Walton League of Am. v. 
Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 374 n.73 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 148.  See John D. Leshy, Non-NEPA Legal Aspects of Federal Coal Leasing 
and Development Policy: An Environmental Attorney’s Analysis, 9 Nat. Resource L. 
495, 496 (1976); John L. Watson, The Federal Coal Follies—A New Program Ends 
(Begins) A Decade of Anxiety? 58 Denv. L.J. 65, 78 (1980). 
 149.  Horwitch, supra note 27, at 79–81, 92.  The DOI had examined the 
nation’s coal resources and concluded that revisions to the leasing program were 
necessary.  See 35 Fed. Reg. 3815-01 (Feb. 27, 1970); Robert H. Nelson, Public 
Lands and Private Rights: The Failure of Scientific Management 287 (1995). 
 150.  38 Fed. Reg. 4682 (1973). 
 151.  Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 397–398. 
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completion of the EIS.152  The district court agreed, but a divided panel of 
the court of appeals thought otherwise; and the appeals court held that 
NEPA required a regional EIS if the DOI continued to “contemplate” 
federal action in the Northern Great Plains Region.153   
The court of appeals observed that the government could 
adequately address the cumulative impact of the numerous development 
activities occurring in the region only through a regionally focused EIS.  
The government conceded that its EIS for the national coal program did 
not address the cumulative impact of development in the region.154  The 
court’s narrow decision noted the importance of addressing cumulative 
impacts—but did not require an EIS unless the government actually 
engages in some “regional” program.  Here, the court found sufficient 
evidence that the government had treated the Northern Great Plains as a 
distinct region warranting a regional program.155 According to the court, 
“when the federal government, through exercise of its power to approve 
leases, mining plans, rights-of-way, and water option contracts, attempts 
to ‘control development’ of a definite region, it is engaged in a regional 
program constituting major federal action within the meaning of NEPA, 
whether it labels its attempts a ‘plan,’ a ‘program,’ or nothing at all.”156  
But the majority added that such a conclusion did not necessarily dictate 
the development of a comprehensive regional EIS.157  Instead, a court 
must still assess whether the government’s contemplation of a regional 
program has ripened sufficiently to progress beyond a “dream” stage, an 
assessment initially reserved to the agency—although here the majority 
noted that the record supported that it had.158  
The Supreme Court disagreed, affirming the government’s 
approach to NEPA.159  The Court addressed two issues: first, whether a 
 
 152.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-13, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 
856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), appealed sub nom. Kleppe, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (No. 75-552). 
 153.  Sierra Club, 514 F.2d at 864-66, 71. 
 154.  Id. at 872 n. 23.  The potential threat posed by the cumulative impact of 
individual activities in the Northern Great Plains region dominated the court’s 
discussion about the need for an EIS.  Id. at 868–873.  EPA notably promoted 
analyzing cumulative impacts.  Id. at 878 n.28. 
 155.  Id. at 876. 
 156.  Id. at 878. 
 157.  Id. at 879. 
 158.  Id. at 879–880. 
 159.  Of course, the Court arguably rendered little more than an advisory 
opinion.  A former Solicitor of the DOI has explained how the agency already had 
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comprehensive EIS would be required “when a number of federal actions 
are closely related,” such that “the environment impact and effects of one 
of them cannot be analyzed without considering the impact and effects of 
other related actions”;160 and, second, whether the circumstances 
surrounding activities in the Northern Great Plains region presented such a 
situation.  Counsel explained that the DOI’s failure to engage in a 
sufficiently broad cumulative impact analysis for each leasing project 
made such a comprehensive analysis necessary.161  The Court refused to 
infer the presence of a regional program and concluded that an EIS was 
required only if there has been “a report or recommendation on a proposal 
 
been engaged in various pieces of litigation and had decided to propose the type of 
regional activity being argued about in Kleppe.  Leo M. Krulitz, Management of 
Federal Coal Resources, 24 Rocky Mt. Mineral L. Inst. 139, 177 (1978).  Also, the 
Interior DOI’s 1975 national coal leasing proposal generated controversy and was 
enjoined in 1977 in a separate lawsuit due to lack of adequate NEPA compliance.  
Congress too was not sitting idly bye, passing the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 and, in 1977, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 
1976 and the Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act in 1977.  See Martin, supra n. 
45, at 1021–22. 
 160.  Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari at 49, Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), appealed sub nom. Kleppe, 427 U.S. 390 
(1976) (No. 75-552).  Respondents cited several cases supporting the need for a 
comprehensive EIS that included a cumulative impact analysis—although not 
distinguishing between site specific and programmatic actions: Nat. Resources Def. 
Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st 
Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1971); 
Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Chelsa Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. 
Postal Service, 516 F.2d 378 (2nd Cir. 1975); Nat. Resources Def. Council v. 
Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1975).  The leading case, according to both the D.C. 
Circuit and Respondents, was Scientists’ Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 
F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari at 52, supra. 
 161. Responding to a question, counsel explained: 
if the government’s position had ever been that what they propose 
to do was in the context of an individual project, to look at the 
entire interrelationship in a region, there would not have been any 
litigation.  The government’s position from the start, and it still is 
today, that they do not have to look beyond the specific project. 
Transcr. of Oral Argument at 50-51, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (No. 75-
552). Counsel further added that they could have proceeded by challenging each 
individual EIS, but judicial economy dictated otherwise. Id. at 51.  He also admitted 
that the DOI was preparing an assessment of regional impacts, although disclaiming 
mootness because the DOI was doing so voluntarily rather than being required to do 
so. Id. at 59-60. 
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for a major federal action,” and no such report or recommendation 
existed.162  Absent such a proposal, the Court reasoned, an EIS would be 
transformed into a generalized study document rather than a detailed 
statement outlining the alternatives and effects of any proposed plan. In 
short, “[t]here would be no factual predicate for the production of an 
environmental impact statement of the type envisioned by NEPA.”163 
Consequently, the Court concluded that NEPA could not be used to force 
planning in advance of any proposal.164   
The Court also addressed whether a programmatic (regional) EIS 
might be necessary when a number of site-specific activities are 
“intimately related.”165   While the Court accepted that a comprehensive 
EIS might be appropriate when several activities with cumulative or 
synergistic impacts are being proposed in a region,166 it concluded that the 
failure to prepare such an EIS would be judged under—the albeit lenient 
standard—of arbitrariness.167  Here, the Department easily satisfied that 
standard because the record purportedly lacked any evidence of arbitrary 
behavior by the Department.168 
While Kleppe suggests that—absent a regional proposal or 
decision—neither the COE nor the BLM must prepare a programmatic 
EIS for exports of federal coal,169 NEPA still requires for each specific 
 
 162.  Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 399. 
 163.  Id. at 402. 
 164.  Id. at 405–406. 
 165.  Id. at 408. 
 166.  Id. at 409–410.  Later, the Court emphasized this point by observing 
“[c]umulative environmental impacts are, indeed, what require a comprehensive 
impact statement.”  Id. at 413. 
 167.  Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412. 
 168.  Id. at 412–14.  E.g., Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Resources Council, 490 U.S. 
360, 378 (1989) (arbitrary and capricious standard). 
 169.  In Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2001), the 
Ninth Circuit reviewed the case law and upheld the decision not to prepare a PEIS, 
suggesting that an agency’s decision to avoid a PEIS does not violate NEPA unless 
the decision impermissibly segments the analysis to minimize possible cumulative 
impacts.  Id. at 1078-80.  See also Found. Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 884 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (PEIS not required for animal productivity research program).  Also, 
even though the CEQ regulations contemplate that agency programs relevant to policy 
decisions ought to be included in a single document, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(b), Forty 
Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations, Question 24a, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18033 (March. 23, 1981), a court 
might be reluctant to intercede and require the preparation of a NEPA document when 
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project a thorough environmental document that analyzes the upstream 
and downstream environmental effects, as well as the cumulative impacts. 
This would include the direct impact from increased rail traffic (and coal 
dust); the direct impact to coastal resources where the ports are located; 
the indirect effects associated with coal utilization; any effects flowing 
from mining activities, if those activities are induced by the exports; and 
then, of course, the “incremental impact of the action when added to other 
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.”170 
The difficulty of meaningfully examining the array of effects is 
that much of the analysis is necessarily generalized and often beyond the 
expertise of the particular agency.  How, for instance, will either the COE 
or the BLM assess the likely amount of coal being shipped to still un-
determined countries, over an un-determined period of time, to be utilized 
by power plants with an un-determined and possibly changing 
technological future?171  How much PRB coal, by contrast, will be 
 
an agency only has begun to announce its policy.  See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. 
Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 940 F.2d 679, 684–685 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 170.  40 CFR § 1508.7 (Cumulative Impact).  In N. Plains Resource Council, 
Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1077-83 (9th Cir. 2011), the court required 
a broader cumulative impact analysis of the combined effect of regional coal bed 
methane well development and the construction of a railroad. 
 171.  To the extent that the GHG emissions from the end use of coal is an 
indirect—yet albeit potentially significant—effect, no matter how generalized the 
discussion the NEPA document must include some credible analysis.  See Council of 
Envt’l Quality Climate Guidance; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. National Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).  Of course, the doctrine of 
standing may prevent parties from pressing the NEPA claim.  E.g., Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 475 (D.C. Cir.  2009) (GHG 
emissions from offshore oil and gas leasing program); Montana Envt’l Info. Ctr. v. 
Bureau of Land Mgt, No. 11-00015, slip op. (D. Mont. June 14, 2013) (denying 
standing to oil and gas leasing decision); WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 859 F. 
Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying standing in challenge involving recertification of 
coal region).  See also Manuel Quinones, Groups Take Fight Against BLM Coal Lease 
to Appellate Court, E&E News (March 13, 2013); Mark Squillace, Alexander N. 
Hood, NEPA, Climate Change, and Public Lands Decision-Making (U. of Colo Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-13, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912811) (accessed July 13, 2013). 
Because the federal activities are occurring here in the U.S., with impacts quite 
possibly to the global commons—and not necessarily limited to extraterritorial 
impacts, it would be difficult to argue that NEPA does not require an examination into 
these effects. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (NEPA 
applied to National Science Foundation program in Antarctica); Nat. Resources Def. 
Council v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1353, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
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consumed here in the U.S., possibly displacing eastern coal, and 
correspondingly how much coal will be leased and then subject to federal 
diligent development requirements?  These and other similar questions 
underscore the degree of speculation inherent in any attempted 
analysis.172 Absent a forum and opportunity for fundamental initial policy 
determinations, including how much federal coal the U.S. should develop, 
and when, and quite possibly under what conditions it can be used, any 
generalized discussion will not necessarily lead to an informed, or at least, 
coordinated policy decision. 
 
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission examined the impact on the global commons for the 
exports of nuclear reactors, although asserting that foreign impacts not required under 
NEPA); Gov’t of the Province of Manitoba v. Salazar, 691 F. Supp. 2d 37, 51 (D.D.C. 
2010) (impacts in Canada must be assessed when federal actions occurring in the 
U.S.); Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 
(plaintiffs argued that OPIC’s actions affected “domestic environment”); Border 
Power Plant Working Group v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 
2003) (cross-border power line); Nat. Resources Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 
2002 WL 32095131 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (NEPA applied to Navy operations having 
effect in U.S. exclusive economic zone).  See generally Jeffrey E. Gonzalez-Perez & 
Douglas A. Klein, The International Reach of the Environmental Impact Statement 
Requirement of National Environmental Policy Act, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 757 
(1994); Lilly Fang, Note, Environmental Review Problems of Cross-Border Projects 
Under NEPA: Lessons from the Tar Sands Pipelines, 31 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 285 (2012); 
Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement 
Requirement, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 349 (1975). 
 172.  While speculation or hypothesizing may not be precluded, detailed 
analysis may not be necessary where too much uncertainty exists.  See Fund for 
Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 137 (2nd Cir. 2008); see also Reed v. Salazar, 
744 F. Supp. 2d 98, 118 (D.D.C. 2010) (uncertain effects distinguished from 
uncertainty surrounding agency’s own action); Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. 
Forsgren, 336 F.3d 944, 962 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that NEPA requires some level of 
speculation and labeling effects as speculative does not obviate need to review).  In S. 
Coast Air Quality Mgt. Dist. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 621 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 
2010), for example, the court did not require a detailed analysis of the end use burning 
of foreign LNG.  FERC also declined to assess in any detailed fashion induced shale 
gas development from either a pipeline or a LNG export terminal, because of the 
degree of uncertainty and amount of speculation required.  Coalition for Responsible 
Growth and Resource Conservation v. FERC, 485 Fed. App. 472 (2nd Cir. 2012); 
Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC & Sabine Pass LNG, L.P., Order Denying Rehearing 
and Stay, 139 FERC ¶ 61,039 (U.S. FERC July 26, 2012). 
 COAL’S PLATEAU AND ENERGY HORIZON? 183 
IV. EMPOWERING A NEW PARADIGM 
The pragmatic problem, therefore, is how can either the COE or 
the BLM prepare a meaningful analysis, without first making certain 
assumptions that are well beyond their primary mission?  Implementing a 
coordinated energy, climate change, and natural resource policy entails a 
multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional systems analysis,173 by an agency 
or department charged with examining fundamental policy alternatives.   
That function—whether appropriate or not—is performed by the State 
Department for cross-border oil pipelines, such as TransCanada’s 
Keystone XL project;174 it is performed jointly by the Department of 
Energy and FERC for LNG exports;175 it is performed somewhat 
asymmetrically by EIA working with the DOI for offshore oil and gas 
leasing;176 and, in the 1970s, the Department of Energy performed that 
function for coal exports.177  But for the fundamental challenges 
confronting coal, no agency or department is charged with examining the 
possible paths for coal and the correspondingly commensurate decisions: 
Should we expand our coal export capacity, and if so under what 
conditions, or should we lease more federal coal, and if so under what 
conditions, or should we continue with diligent development requirements, 
and if so under what scenarios?  And, each of these issues requires an 
acute appreciation for the ever-changing U.S. and world-wide electric 
energy feedstock (renewables, fossil fuels, efficiency and conservation) 
market, as well as how GHG emissions will be reduced both domestically 
and internationally. 
 
 173.  See Sam Kalen, Replacing A National Energy Policy With a National 
Resource Policy, 19 Nat. Resources & Env. 9 (Winter 2005). 
 174.  See generally Sam Kalen, Thirst for Oil and the Keystone XL Pipeline, 
46 Creighton L. Rev. 1 (2012). 
 175.  See supra n. 126 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See Kalen, supra n. 23. 
 177.  E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Energy Interagency Coal Export Task Force, 
Interim Report of the Interagency Coal Export Task Force: Draft I-2 (1981) (noting 
Presidential Dec. 1980 conference on coal exports and creation of interagency task 
force) (on file with author).  DOI also had established a Coal Review Group, tasked 
with developing a “workable, environmentally sound” program for responding “to the 
country’s need for coal production.”  Wicks, supra n. 45, at 667.  For a description of 
how the Interior Department program in the late 1970s sought to assess leasing needs, 
see Martin, supra n. 45, at 1035–1036, 1038. 
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One possible solution would be to task the Department of Energy 
with the responsibility of undertaking the requisite analysis and 
developing the administration’s overall policy.  When the government 
attempted a similar analysis in the 1970s,178 neither modeling nor 
computer technology permitted a sufficiently reliable assessment.  Today, 
our ability to model future scenarios with multiple inputs and variables is 
quite different—and, while not perfect, is capable of serving as a 
foundation for sound decision-making.  EIA’s energy projections routinely 
serve this function.  And, to the extent that the Department of Energy 
engages in a holistic analysis of what will best serve the national energy 
and climate interest, a comprehensive programmatic EIS that examines the 
direct, indirect, and cumulative effects, as well as explores the array of 
reasonable alternatives, is appropriate and necessary.  This is precisely the 
sort of function a Department of Energy could and perhaps should serve. 
Of course, congressional action is presumably the predicate for 
any such Departmental undertaking.  Review and control over certain 
exports can occur when emergencies exist,179 but it is not clear that DOE 
presently possesses sufficient authority to warrant the Department’s 
investment of time and resources.  It would be meaningful legislation, 
therefore, only if the Department had sufficient capacity to explore all 
options and the authority to make appropriate decisions or provide other 
agencies with “the Administration’s” recommendations for how to 
proceed.  The legislative effort also might require an accompanying 
Administration initiative to ensure that the agency possesses the requisite 
resources, expertise, and commitment to excellence necessary to 
accomplish what has alluded this country for quite some time—a holistic, 
coordinated and thoughtful energy policy.  This might, then, facilitate a 
forward-looking review that decides what paths might exist for coal, 
particularly coal from our public lands. 
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V. CONCLUSION: COAL’S THREE-WAY JUNCTION 
Assuming the United States neither reverses its policy toward 
reducing GHG emissions nor rejects further unconventional gas 
development, the future U.S. market for coal appears somewhat bounded.  
Even if 25 percent of coal-fired capacity is retired by 2035, coal will 
continue to feed the fleet of existing coal-fired power plants not slated for 
retirement, and a growing percentage of that coal will likely be western 
coal.180  The coal industry undoubtedly can, and likely will, continue its 
quest for frontier markets—possibly China or India.  This will require 
public support and approval for increasing the capacity of our ports—a 
considerable challenge.  Two alternative paths, however, could become 
viable: first, utilities could be convinced that newer technologies could 
become commercially available and competitive, providing utilities with 
sufficient security that coal can be utilized in a carbon-constrained world; 
second, the coal industry could return to its past and become a 
transportation fuel—this time, not for railroads, but rather by converting 
coal’s energy potential into a liquid transportation fuel.   
But other known technology paths persist, and necessarily 
supplement what are likely as yet un-conceived options for coal.  For 
several decades, the concept of “clean coal” technologies seemingly 
captured coal’s promise.181  It was a component of President Bush’s 
National Energy Strategy.182  Only recently, however, has the nation’s 
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first ultra-supercritical coal fired power plant commenced operations.183  
And, the same is true with the development of Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) power plants, which use a gasifier to convert 
coal into a syngas and ultimately electricity.184  The National Energy 
Technology Laboratory suggests that such plants offer “unprecedented 
levels of operating efficiency.”185  Yet, of the various proposed IGCC 
projects, very few have proceeded.186  Today, instead, most topical 
discussions about coal and technology focus on the prospects for and 
commercial viability of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).187  
President Obama, for instance, issued a memorandum establishing an 
Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage, with the goal of 
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facilitating the commercial deployment of the technology.188  The U.S. 
apparently has the capacity to store approximately 2,400 billion metric 
tons of CO2.189  Until recently, the initial movement toward an early 
embrace of CCS waned, as funding constraints and low natural gas prices 
combined to retard some of the early enthusiasm.190  Lately, the Obama 
Administration touts the need to become even more engaged in efforts to 
develop commercially viable CCS technologies.191 Industry’s poster child 
for future CCS projects has been the FutureGen zero emission project,192 
whose history has reflected the struggle to deploy the technology 
commercially.  The project received a major boost initially, in December 
2012, when the Illinois Commerce Commission approved a power 
purchase agreement from the project and then two months later upon 
DOE’s announcement of continued support.193 
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Lately, some companies are exploring—yet again—the possibility 
of converting coal to liquids for use as a transportation fuel.194   A vibrant 
dialogue surrounds promoting how the modern transportation system 
might become more flexible and accommodate sources other than crude 
oil.  The transportation sector, heavily dependent upon oil, accounts for 
roughly one-third of our GHG emissions.195  To the extent, therefore, that 
the nation can replace oil with less GHG intense fuels, climate advocates 
urge the development of new fuels, including natural gas or natural gas 
liquids.  When oil became scarce in South Africa many decades ago, for 
instance, Sasol used coal to produce synthetic oil.196  Today, new 
initiatives are peering over the horizon to promote not only a greater use 
of natural gas vehicles,197 but also to produce natural gas liquids from 
either natural gas or coal.198  The Sasol chief executive describes the 
possible wide-scale deployment of gas to liquids as a potential “game-
changer.”199  But the allure of using coal as a feedstock for either diesel or 
gasoline exists, as well.  China apparently is still exploring the potential of 
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converting its coal resources into a transportation fuel.200  Domestically, 
DKRW Advanced Fuels Company is exploring the development of a 
Wyoming facility that would convert coal from the PRB into liquids.201 
Assessing which, if any, of these options might be economically 
realistic and comport with sound policy choices will require a new 
administrative structure.  It will require some sort of programmatic review, 
by an agency capable of weighing economic, social, and environmental 
policy considerations.  It will require developing, realistically for the first 
time since the 1970s, a national energy policy that merges economic, 
environmental and public land policies into a coherent and coordinated 
strategy.  It will require carefully examining existing programs and, quite 
possibly, suggesting administrative or legislative changes.  Consequently, 
it will require that the Department of Energy assume the type of 
responsibility necessary to carry the U.S. through the 21st century. 
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